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#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action --- the aff is a regulation

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Vote neg---

#### Only prohibitions on authority guarantee neg ground---their interpretation lets affs no link the best neg offense like deference

#### Precision---only our interpretation defines “restrictions on authority”---that’s key to adequate preparation and policy analysis

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#### TPA will pass but PC is key

Inside U.S. Trade, 2-14 ["Boustany Sees Significant Effort To Lock In House GOP Support For TPA," 2-14-14, l/n, accessed 2-19-14]

Rep. Charles Boustany (R-LA), who is helping to informally whip House Republicans on a pending Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) bill, said last week that he is "guardedly optimistic" about the level of support within the caucus for the legislation, but that a lot of work is still needed to round up sufficient Republican votes. In a Feb. 7 interview with Inside U.S. Trade, Boustany indicated that "a lot of work" is still needed to round up Republican votes because many members are not yet focused on TPA given other priorities. They are reluctant to take a position one way or another without having looked at the details of the pending bill, he said. He said five House Republicans that he reached to last week about the TPA bill appeared generally favorable toward it, but remain undecided at this point. He stressed that this outreach is "still an educational process." Boustany said efforts to round up Republican votes for the TPA bill face "headwinds posed by outside groups," though he did not elaborate who was lobbying these members to oppose the legislation. He said claims by one TPA opponent that 50-70 Republicans would vote against TPA seem "a little high." At the same time, he stressed that Republicans do not want to take anything for granted. "When we mark people in the 'yes' column, we want to be absolutely certain they're in the 'yes' column," he said. House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) last week implicitly acknowledged the extent of Republican opposition to the bill by saying his party alone cannot muster the 218 votes needed for House passage. Boustany seemed to signal that the House GOP leadership may be willing to back off its demand that there must be at least 50 Democrats in favor before it can be put up for a House vote. He referred to this number as a "general starting point" to put the administration "on notice that they're going to have to step up their game." In general, he stressed that President Obama's entire Cabinet should be on the Hill pushing for TPA, also known as fast track. Boustany said this is "a really important time for the president to get involved with Wyden, [Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV)], and to really expend the political capital to let these guys know this is a top priority."

#### The plan is a huge loss for Obama –Democrats cracking down on war powers makes Obama look weak

Paterno 6/23/2013 (Scott, Writer for Rock the Capital, “Selfish Obama” http://www.rockthecapital.com/06/23/selfish-obama/)

Now we have a Democratic president who wants to make war and does not want to abide by the War Powers Resolution. But rather than truly test the constitutionality of the measure, he is choosing to simply claim that THIS use of US military power is not applicable.¶ This is an extraordinarily selfish act, and one liberals especially should fear. POTUS is setting a precedent that subsequent presidents will be able to use – presidents that the left might not find so “enlightened.” Left as is, President Obama has set a standard where the president can essentially attack anywhere he wants without congressional approval for as long as he wants so long as he does not commit ground forces.¶ That is an extraordinarily selfish act. Why selfish? Because the president is avoiding congress because he fears a rebuke – from his own party, no less. The politically safe way to both claim to be decisive and to not face political defeat at the hands of Democrats – a defeat that would signal White House weakness – is to avoid congress all together. Precedent be damned, there is an election to win after all.

#### Capital is key to get a deal through

Atkinson 2/6/14 (Robert, The Huffington Post, President of the Information TEchnology and Innovation Foundation")

Judging by congressional reaction to the trade elements in the State of the Union, President Obama still has his work cut out for him if he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and Republicans (who may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). The bottom line is that the president is going to have to become far more involved if he wants to see movement on his top trade priorities this year.¶ To be clear, there's plenty at stake. Apart from removing the most obvious barriers to trade, like tariffs, U.S. negotiators are pushing for the TPP to contain strong and enforceable protections for intellectual property (IP), as well as reductions in non-tariff barriers in order to help ensure the U.S. maintains its global edge in innovation. This push is especially important in areas such as life sciences and information technology, where growth in exports means growth in high-paying jobs. According to the Department of Commerce, IP-intensive industries account for over 27 percent of all jobs in the U.S. economy. By enabling U.S. innovation, we lay the groundwork for future innovation, as companies reinvest in the substantial R&D necessary to develop new medicines, software and other cutting-edge products that the world needs and wants.¶ Unfortunately, there's certainly cause for concern where IP rights are concerned regarding the TPP. Five participants in the TPP negotiations, Canada, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Vietnam, are on the USTR's Watch or Priority Watch List of the [2013 Special 301 Report](http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publications/2013/2013-special-301-report), which annually reviews countries that maintain inadequate and ineffective intellectual property protection and enforcement. In addition, ITIF's Global Innovation Policy Index lists Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam in either its lower-middle or lower tier of innovation policy capacity. In order to ensure we realize the potential of the TPP, our negotiators must guarantee IP rights and global trade rules will be respected, protected and enforced the way we do here in the United States. The only way we can do that is if the President shows he's serious about concluding a high-standard agreement.How can this be accomplished in 2014? First, President Obama needs to personally lobby hesitant members of Congress to pass Trade Promotion Authority legislation with broad bipartisan support. This action will send a clear signal to the rest of the world that the United States is serious about its belief that open and fair trade benefits producers and consumers both in the United States and in our partner nations around the world.

#### TPA is key to major trade deals

Nawaguna, 12-10 -- Reuters staff

[Elvina, "U.S. Congress could OK trade promotion bill in early 2014, lawmaker says," Reuters, 12-10-13, www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/10/us-usa-trade-idUSBRE9B919020131210, accessed 1-3-14]

The Obama administration has said it needs Congress to approve TPA, which would allow any trade deal to move swiftly through Congress. With TPA, lawmakers cannot amend or filibuster trade deals but can still vote for or against them. The administration needs that fast-track rule to clinch two huge trade deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other Pacific Rim countries, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union. The administration argues that TPA, which expired in 2007, is useful in coaxing countries to put their best deal on the table without fearing that Congress could reopen and amend them.

#### Protectionism leads to Nuclear war

**Panzner 8** – faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### 1NC

Text: The People’s Republic of China should cease the development and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles.

CP solves the norms adv and is mutually exclusive US and China norms are zero sum

**Roy ’13** [Dr. Denny Roy, Ph.D., Political Science, University of Chicago, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, “More Security for Rising China, Less for Others?” January, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=159877&contextid774=159877&contextid775=159870&tabid=1453528668]

With greater relative capabilities, China’s aspirations will expand. The country will use its economic and diplomatic influence, with expanding military capabilities in the background, to press neighboring governments to conform to its wishes on political issues. For example, the upgraded PRC navy, originally limited to coastal missions, is implementing a new concept of “far sea defense.” Under this doctrine Chinese warships project naval power into distant oceans, even preparing for the contingency of escorting ships from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean. The deputy commander of China’s East Sea Fleet explicitly linked China’s economic growth with a stronger military: “With the expansion of the country’s economic interests,” he said, “the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes . . . [and therefore] needs to develop along the lines of bigger vessels and with more comprehensive capabilities.” [6]¶ As China’s security demands expand, inevitably they will further impinge on the strategic freedom of other Asia Pacific countries. In the case of the “sensitive” issues that involve CCP legitimacy or are within the presumed Chinese sphere of influence, the usual restraints against heavy-handed Chinese behavior are relatively less powerful. The imperative of self-defense takes precedence over Chinese fears of appearing dishonorable or threatening. Yet Chinese actions in their backyard challenge areas of vital interest to other countries.¶ An example is Taiwan. Beijing insists that the government of China (i.e., the CCP) has sovereignty over the island even if Taiwan’s inhabitants may disagree. The PRC asserts a position (backed by the threat of military force) that represents an existential threat to the people of Taiwan and their chosen political and economic system. In the case of the South China Sea, Beijing refuses to renounce its claim to ownership of nearly the entire body of water. This denies the Southeast Asian claimant countries even the coastal exclusive economic zones that are granted by the Law of the Sea Treaty, of which China is a signatory. When high-ranking Chinese military men and many Chinese media organs stridently objected to 2010 US–South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea that were amply justified by North Korean provocations, the PRC implicitly asserted that China should have veto power over US security cooperation with a formal US ally in waters near the ally’s coast.¶ The rise of China has a particular impact on US-China relations. The United States is the principal sponsor of a historically unique regional security order. This order includes an architecture of US alliances, forward-deployed bases, and international institutions, overlaid with a set of widely accepted norms regulating international affairs. This order reflects US interests and values, but not necessarily those of China. As the rising power, China naturally aspires to take leadership of the regional order from the old master and to revise it to China’s liking. History has seen other cases like this, and past experience suggests the scenario is dangerous. The rising challenger may pick a fight because it is impatient and wants to speed up the transition, while the reigning great power may consider starting a preventive war before its power level is surpassed by the rising challenger. Some scholars argue that the risk of war is low in this case: China and the United States lack a compelling reason to go to war against each other; both have nuclear weapons, which makes them cautious about getting into even a conventional conflict; and both would rather concentrate on domestic issues and gain through peaceful trade.[7]¶ Nevertheless, maintaining equilibrium between US accommodation and Chinese patience will become increasingly difficult, posing a stiff challenge to future US and PRC leaders. Beijing clearly aims to ease out the United States as a strategic player in the western Pacific. In the short term, the PRC expects Washington to extract itself from the Taiwan issue (by phasing out arms sales) and from the South China Sea issue. China’s long-term vision for East Asia has no room for US bases or alliances.¶ Selective Global Citizenship¶ On global security issues outside China’s perceived sphere of influence, cooperation between the country and other major powers is potentially easier because the sense of a proprietary Chinese interest is weaker. China, however, only conditionally supports international norms. In the Chinese view, these norms and most of modern international law reflect a relatively recent and anomalous period of Western global dominance. Thus the Chinese are not intrinsically supportive of Western norms and law. Beijing tends to fall in line when it faces a united international consensus to avoid attracting negative attention as an outlier. The Chinese often appeal to widely accepted international laws and principles that bear on international security, but in a selective way in support of specific Chinese policies. As China’s interests become more global and less parochial, Beijing has a greater interest in maintaining stability in far-flung parts of the world. Chinese leaders may therefore take a more managerial view of global affairs and see wisdom in more closely aligning Chinese policy with an evolving set of internationally negotiated rules of international affairs. On the other hand, with continued relative growth the Chinese will be in a stronger position to assert alternative principles to justify actions that suit narrow PRC interests.¶ For the foreseeable future, **Beijing’s objectives will clash with** important **security**-related **norms upheld by** most of the **other** major **powers**. The PRC’s support for multinational efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has improved since the 1980s, but the process has been slow and halting. China’s unannounced destruction in 2007 of one of its satellites in orbit, which created a debris field that will imperil other countries’ space equipment for years, was disturbing. China is the source of a massive and well-organized computer hacking campaign against the United States and other countries that attempts not only to steal their industrial secrets but also to compromise their security. [8] Claims of noninvolvement in this outlaw activity by the PRC government have become difficult to take seriously.¶ The Beijing government is highly fearful of attempts by the Western governments (especially the United States) to overthrow Chinese Communist Party rule. This has led to the PRC’s “non-intervention” doctrine, which continues to conflict with the UN-recognized “responsibility to protect.” Beijing often shelters and supports authoritarian regimes, which impedes the global promotion of good governance, civil liberties, and social justice. Lack of progress in these areas contributes to conditions in which terrorist organizations can flourish. ¶ When the major Western countries try to employ sanctions against misbehaving countries with which China has valuable economic and political partnerships, China tends to resist, putting forward the principle that sanctions are unjust and ineffective. [9] Yet Beijing has on several occasions implemented or threatened sanctions against countries that tread on narrow Chinese interests. China’s overall record demonstrates at best selective defense of global security norms. A stronger China is more capable of undermining international efforts to discipline outlaw regimes in cases where the perceived value of a bilateral relationship outweighs Beijing’s sense of international citizenship.¶ Not-So-Pacific Century?¶ If China’s preferences were fulfilled, countries in the region would defer to China on all major international issues. Based on recent positions taken by Beijing, the PRC’s objectives clearly include gaining rule-setting authority over the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea; victory for the PRC in all of its claims to disputed territory; greatly reduced security cooperation between the region and the United States, including the elimination of US bases and the “Cold War era” US alliances with Asia Pacific countries; the end of Western efforts to promote democratization in Asia; absorption of Taiwan into the PRC; a militarily weak Japan that accommodates Beijing; and the continued survival of the North Korean government along with deepening economic integration between North Korea and China’s northeastern provinces. These form China’s maximum objectives. ¶ Short of achieving the entirety of these objectives, China’s people can certainly achieve a reasonable amount of security and prosperity while playing within the current international rules or by peacefully seeking to adjust those rules. None of the Asia Pacific governments actively opposes China becoming wealthy or addressing legitimate Chinese security concerns. In striving to realize all of their preferences, however, the Chinese would reduce the security and prosperity of other countries in the region. The question is whether the Chinese can settle for getting much but not all of what they want. Unfortunately, Chinese impatience with aspects of the status quo they dislike can be expected to increase, driven by nationalistic elite groups (led by the People’s Liberation Army) and vociferous segments of PRC public opinion. The current situation features strong cushioning against conflict: China benefits handsomely from peaceful engagement within the current system, while the promise of coordinated international resistance led by the superpower United States helps deter Chinese behavior that other states would consider threatening.¶ Two major concerns emerge. The first is China’s willfulness within the sphere of influence to which the Chinese believe they are entitled. What the Chinese may see as their backyard is other countries’ front yards. Yet persuading the PRC to climb down from contentious positions it has taken on some strategic issues in the near abroad will be difficult. One reason is the expectation that China’s material strength will continue to grow relative to other states in the region. The Chinese have cause to believe their economic and political importance will eventually become so overwhelming as to force regional governments to submit to Chinese preferences.¶ Another reason for China to resist compromising its maximum objectives is that the leadership in Beijing fears the wrath of nationalistic public opinion at home. Understandably, the legitimacy-hungry CCP has tried to gain credit among the Chinese people for establishing China’s international status as a great power. This mood of national triumphalism, however, has the unintended effect of intensifying domestic pressure on the government to stand up to foreign governments in defense of China’s interests. In contrast to the recent past, much of the Chinese public closely follows developments in international affairs and is immediately aware of acts by the Chinese government that Chinese nationalists would consider overly submissive. [10] Generally, the effect of **these** domestic nationalistic **forces** is to **push the Chinese government toward more confrontational foreign policies**. Mobilized public opinion sometimes forces Beijing’s top leadership to take tough actions opposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requiring subsequent damage control by Chinese diplomats. China’s diplomatic partners must understand that nationalistic domestic forces constrain decision making by the top level of PRC leadership.

#### Chinese can effectively use soft power now, which is uniquely effective- US model fails

**Hölkemeyer 12-6**-13 [Patricia Rodríguez Hölkemeyer, research professor and deputy director of the School of Political Science at the University of Costa Rica, Honorary Member of the Academy Research Center of Central Private, “China's forthcoming soft power as a natural result of international events,” <http://www.china.org.cn/china/Chinese_dream_dialogue/2013-12/06/content_30822607.htm>]

On the other side, Deng'saphorism that China should never strive to attain global hegemony has been widely respected by its leaders and reformers. Nevertheless, today circumstances have changed. China's ancient thinkers rejected the idea of searching for hegemony through stratagems, and favored instead the accomplishment of what Mencius and Xuzi called humane authority. Nevertheless, at the present moment China does not need to strive for the attainment of a leading role because the present world circumstances are catapulting her to become a world superpower. What are the present world circumstances that have put China in the position to have a say in international affairs without having to strive for hegemony? Why is the Western 'presumptive paradigm' (Rodrik)for development failing contrastingly to the pragmatic and experimental learning paradigm of the Chinese reformers that Joshua Cooper Ramo dubbed the Beijing Consensus? The ex-ante presumption of knowledge, a characteristic of the Western countries and global institutions, very probably will be ceding its place to a Deweyian pragmatic change of paradigm, according to which, even the mere conception of what is the best form of democracy is fallible and contextual. ¶ Very probably, the paradigm of 'arrogance' will be giving place to a paradigm based on what the political scientist, Karl Deutsch, once called 'humility'. Deutsch defined its opposite "arrogance" as the posture of permitting oneself the luxury of not to learn (because it is supposed that one has already learned everything), while he defines 'humility' as the attitude of the political leader who is always open to learning from others. The West has forgotten that the concept of feedback (learning form the other) is the biggest bite to the tree of knowledge that humanity has undertaken in the last two thousand years (Bateson). A new concept of democracy has to take into consideration this advancement as the Chinese reform process has done. Western countries' presumptive frame of mind has been slowly losing momentum. The present circumstances provide a clear indication that one of the most cared institutions, the Western multiparty democracy system, has been losing its ability to learn, and thus, its capacity to offer creative solutions to its own and the world's problems. As a former US Ambassador to China said two years ago, the willingness of Chinese leaders to learn from their errors and adapt to new circumstances "differs sharply from what one encounters in Washington, where there's such concern over our inability to correct the problems that are making our political system — in the eyes of many Americans — increasingly dysfunctional."¶ The US has to enhance its learning capacity if it wants to lead in world affairs in cooperation with the newly emerging superpower. The West has to acknowledge that the so called American values are not universal, that harmony implies unity in diversity, that the concept of democracy is fallible and mutable, and that hegemony has to cede to a well gained humane authority, not only abroad but domestically.¶ Since W. W. II, the US attained the soft power that China lacked. Nevertheless, the US insistence in the maintenance of an hegemonic international order applying the smart power (a new concept of Joseph Nye) stratagems, has culminated in the observed failure of the misnamed Arab Spring, even if the application of smart power (instigation through political activism, and the posterior use of military power if necessary) was partially successful in the so called Color Revolutions (Rodríguez-Hölkemeyer, 2013).¶ Given the present circumstances (as the effects of 9/11, the global financial crisis, the formation of the G20, the global rejection of US espionage stratagems, the failure of the Pivot to the East policy due to the attention the US had to devote to the failed Arab Spring, to an ailing Europe, and to its own domestic financial and political problems) China's possibilities to acquire soft power and to exert its positive influence way the international governing institutions and in international relations, are now real. The world needs a new international relations paradigm, other than the Western style democracy promotion policy through political activism (see the book of the present US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad)orchestrated by organized minorities (NGOs) who want to impose the so called 'American values' in countries with different historical paths, culture and aspirations. The new paradigm will have to be founded in ethics, wisdom, cooperation, confidence-building, and on the recognition that knowledge is fallible and hypothetical, and that with globalization world circumstances and interactions are prone to change. This new paradigm has already been successfully tested in the 35 years of China's own economic and institutional reform process and diplomatic practice. This adaptive and learning-prone attitude of the Chinese leaders, even to the point of adapting (not adopting) western suggestions and institutions when necessary, is the underlying cause of the success of the admirable and unique Chinese development path. As Mencius and Xuzi's observations suggest that a country cannot exert international influence if its own house is not in order.¶ In sum, the present article states that now China possesses a substantive experiential wisdom to start a very productive dialogue with the World. Especially in a moment when it is beginning to be clear to many in the World, that to strive for maintaining a hegemonic world order (Mearsheimer) by means of dubious stratagemsis --according to Lao Tzu thought—the kind of response when intentions are going against the natural course of events.

#### US influence trades off with China’s- competing narratives

**Dynon ’13** [Nicholas, PhD candidate at Macquarie University and is coordinator of the Line 21 project, an online resource on Chinese public diplomacy, has served diplomatic postings in Shanghai, Beijing and the Fiji Islands, worked in Australia’s Parliament House as a departmental liaison officer to the Immigration Minister, holds postgraduate degrees from the ANU and the University of Sydney, “Soft Power: A U.S.-China Battleground?” June 19, http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/soft-power-a-u-s-china-battleground/]

Strip away the ostensibly benign surface of public diplomacy, cultural exchanges and language instruction, and it becomes clear that the U.S. and China are engaged in a soft power conflagration – a protracted cultural cold war. On one side bristles incumbent Western values hegemon, the U.S. On the other is China, one of the non-Western civilizations that Samuel Huntington noted back in 1993 “increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”¶ But to shape the world in non-Western ways means engaging in a soft power battlespace against an incumbent who already holds the high ground. Liu comments that in regions deeply influenced by Western cultures, political systems and values, the “latecomer” China is considered a “dissident force." Under such circumstances, “it is rather difficult for China to attract Western countries with its own political and cultural charisma, let alone to replace their positions.”¶ According to this and similar viewpoints, China’s difficulty in projecting soft power across the world is in part due to the way the U.S. leverages its own soft power. Wu Jianmin, the former president of China’s Foreign Affairs University, puts the point well when explaining that U.S. soft power is driven by the imperative of “maintaining US hegemony in changing the world, of letting the world listen to the United States.”¶ Thus, the state of global post-colonial, post-communist ideational hegemony is such that large swathes of the earth’s population see the world through lenses supplied by the West. Through these lenses, perceptions of China are dominated by such concepts as the “China threat theory,” which portrays China as a malevolent superpower upstart.¶ But it’s actually inside China’s borders where the soft power struggle between China and the U.S. is most prominent.¶ Official pronouncements from Chinese leaders have long played up the notion that Western culture is an aggressive threat to China’s own cultural sovereignty. It has thus taken myriad internal measures to ensure the country’s post-Mao reforms remain an exercise in modernization without “westernization.” Since the 1990s, for example, ideological doctrine has been increasingly infused with a new cultural nationalism, and the Party’s previously archaic propaganda system has been massively overhauled and working harder than ever.¶ Especially after the June 4th crackdown and the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s leaders under Jiang Zemin began addressing the cultural battlespace with renewed vigor. Resolutions launched in 1996 called for the Party to “carry forward the cream of our traditional culture, prevent and eliminate the spread of cultural garbage, [and] resist the conspiracy by hostile forces to ‘Westernize’ and ‘split’ our country….” Hu Jintao trumpeted the same theme in early 2012 when he warned that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernising and dividing China … Ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.”

#### Chinese soft power restrains aggression- solves regional stability

**Huang ’13** [Chin-Hao Huang, Ph.D. Candidate and a Russell Endowed Fellow in the Political Science and International Relations (POIR) Program at the University of Southern California (USC). Until 2009, he was a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden. He specializes in international security and comparative politics, especially with regard to China and Asia, and he has testified before the Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on Chinese foreign and security policy, “China’s Soft Power in East Asia,” <http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/451/docs/Huang_FINAL_China_Soft_Power_and_Status.pdf>]

China’s authoritarian regime is thus the biggest obstacle to its efforts to construct and project soft ¶ power. At the same time, if the government decides to take a different tack—a more constructive ¶ approach that embraces multilateralism—**Chinese soft power could be a positive force multiplier that contributes to peace and stability in the region**. A widely read and cited article published in ¶ Liaowang, a leading CCP publication on foreign affairs, reveals that there are prospects for China being socialized into a less disruptive power that complies with regional and global norms: ¶ Compared with past practices, China’s diplomacy has indeed displayed a new face. If China’s diplomacy before the 1980s stressed safeguarding of national ¶ security, and its emphasis from the 1980s to early this century is on the creation ¶ of an excellent environment for economic development, then the focus at ¶ present is to take a more active part in international affairs and play the role that a responsible power should on the basis of satisfying the security and ¶ development interests.47 The newly minted leadership in Beijing provides China with an opportunity to reset its soft-power approach and the direction of its foreign policy more generally. If the new leadership pursues a ¶ different course, Washington should seize on this opportunity to craft an effective response to ¶ better manage U.S.-China relations and provide for greater stability in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, strengthening regional alliances and existing security and economic architectures could help restrain China’s more bellicose tendencies. At the same time, Washington should be cognizant of the frustrations that are bound to occur in bilateral relations if Beijing continues to define national interest in narrow, self-interested terms. The U.S. should engage more deeply with regional partners to persuade and incentivize China to take on a responsible great-power role commensurate with regional expectations.¶ • The U.S. pivot to the region could be further complemented with an increase in soft-power promotion, including increasing the level of support for Fulbright and other educational exchanges that forge closer professional and interpersonal ties between the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific. Washington should also encourage philanthropy, development assistance, and intellectual engagement by think tanks and civil society organizations that address issues such as public health and facilitate capacity-building projects. China’s rising economic, political, and military power is the most geopolitically significant¶ development of this century. Yet while the breadth of China’s growing power is widely¶ understood, a fulsome understanding of the dynamics of this rise requires a more¶ systematic assessment of the depth of China’s power. Specifically, the strategic, economic,¶ and political implications of China’s soft-power efforts in the region require in-depth analysis.¶ The concept of “soft power” was originally developed by Harvard University professor Joseph Nye¶ to describe the ability of a state to attract and co-opt rather than to coerce, use force, or give money¶ as a means of persuasion.1 The term is now widely used by analysts and statesmen. As originally¶ defined by Nye, soft power involves the ability of an actor to set agendas and attract support on the¶ basis of its values, culture, policies, and institutions. In this sense, he considers soft power to often¶ be beyond the control of the state, and generally includes nonmilitary tools of national power—such¶ as diplomacy and state-led economic development programs—as examples of hard power.¶ Partially due to the obvious pull of China’s economic might, several analysts have broadened Nye’s¶ original definition of soft power to include, as Joshua Kurlantzick observes, “anything outside the¶ military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more¶ coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral¶ organizations.”2 This broader definition of soft power has been exhaustively discussed in China¶ as an element of a nation’s “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli), and some Chinese¶ commentators argue that it is an area where the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may enjoy some¶ advantages vis-à-vis the United States. These strategists advocate spreading appreciation of Chinese¶ culture and values through educational and exchange programs such as the Confucius Institutes.¶ This approach would draw on the attractiveness of China’s developmental model and assistance¶ programs (including economic aid and investment) in order to assuage neighboring countries’¶ concerns about China’s growing hard power.3 China’s soft-power efforts in East Asia—enabled by its active use of coercive economic and social¶ levers such as aid, investment, and public diplomacy—have already accrued numerous benefits for the PRC. Some view the failure of the United States to provide immediate assistance to East and¶ Southeast Asian states during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and China’s widely publicized refusal¶ to devalue its currency at the time (which would have forced other Asian states to follow suit) as a turning point, causing some in Asia to question which great power was more reliable.4 China also uses economic aid, and the withdrawal thereof, as a tool of national power, as seen in China’s considerable aid efforts in Southeast Asia, as well as in its suspension of $200 million in aid to¶ Vietnam in 2006 after Hanoi invited Taiwan to attend that year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation¶ (APEC) summit.5

#### Causes nuclear war- draws in the US

**Eland 12-10**-13 [Ivan Eland,PhD in Public Policy from George Washington University, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, has served as Evaluator-in-Charge for the U.S. General Accounting Office, “Stay Out of Petty Island Disputes in East Asia,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/stay-out-of-petty-island-\_b\_4414811.html]

One of the most dangerous international disputes that the United States could get dragged into has little importance to U.S. security -- the disputes nations have over small islands (some really rocks rising out of the sea) in East Asia. Although any war over these islands would rank right up there with the absurd Falkland Islands war of 1982 between Britain and Argentina over remote, windswept sheep pastures near Antarctica, any conflict in East Asia always has the potential to escalate to nuclear war. And unlike the Falklands war, the United States might be right in the atomic crosshairs.¶ Of the two antagonists in the Falklands War, only Britain had nuclear weapons, thus limiting the possibility of nuclear escalation. And although it is true that of the more numerous East Asian contenders, only China has such weapons, the United States has formal alliance commitments to defend three of the countries in competition with China over the islands -- the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea -- and an informal alliance with Taiwan. Unbeknownst to most Americans, those outdated alliances left over from the Cold War implicitly still commit the United States to sacrifice Seattle or Los Angeles to save Manila, Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei, should one of these countries get into a shooting war with China. Though a questionable tradeoff even during the Cold War, it is even less so today. The "security" for America in this implicit pledge has always rested on avoiding a faraway war in the first place using a tenuous nuclear deterrent against China or any other potentially aggressive power. The deterrent is tenuous, because friends and foes alike might wonder what rational set of U.S. leaders would make this ridiculously bad tradeoff if all else failed. ¶ Of course these East Asian nations are not quarreling because the islands or stone outcroppings are intrinsically valuable, but because primarily they, depending on the particular dispute involved, are in waters that have natural riches -- fisheries or oil or gas resources. ¶ In one dispute, the Senkaku or Diaoyu dispute -- depending on whether the Japanese or Chinese are describing it, respectively -- the United States just interjected itself, in response to the Chinese expansion of its air defense zone over the islands, by flying B-52 bombers through this air space to support its ally Japan. The United States is now taking the nonsensical position that it is neutral in the island kerfuffle, even though it took this bold action and pledged to defend Japan if a war ensues. Predictably and understandably, China believes that the United States has chosen sides in the quarrel.¶ Then to match China, South Korea extended its own air defense zone -- so that it now overlaps that of both China and Japan. But that said, as a legacy of World War II, South Korea seems to get along better with China, its largest trading partner, than it does with Japan. Also, South Korea and Japan have a dispute over the Dokdo or Takeshima Islands, depending on who is describing them, in the Sea of Japan. Because the United States has a formal defense alliance with each of those nations and stations forces in both, which would it support if Japan and South Korea went to war over the dispute? It's anyone's guess.

### 1NC

#### The 1AC’s threats are not real or objective but are filtered through a lens of threat-action discourse – that causes violence

**Grondin 4** (David, Masters in Political Science & Ph.D. Candidate – University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies)

Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

#### Security logic causes devaluation and extinction

Burke 7 (Anthony, lecturer of IR at U New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” December 7, <http://www.hopkins-debate.com/pdf/Burke.pdf>)

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 # We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 # There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 # And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology # If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 # By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 # Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. # Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 # Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. # Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. # Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 # This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.

#### The alt is to vote negative to critique the aff’s security discourse as a prior question – framing comes first

**Cheeseman and Bruce 96** (Graeme, Senior Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert, editor, widespread author on security, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Global Battlefield

#### No internal link to irregular warfare Suadi Arabia should have triggered

#### Perception of weak drone norms is key to continue Russian drone development ---- that is critical to deterring Chechnyan terrorists

ROSMAN 2011 – Yeshiva University, Topic Paper (Rosman, Jordan, Last Cited 2011 articles, http://yu.edu/uploadedfiles/Admissions/Events/YUNMUN/Position\_Papers/DISEC/Rosman\_DISEC\_Topic%201.pdf)

Unmanned Drones as Weapons The Russian Federation believes that the use of UAVs, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, is imperative to fight against terrorism worldwide . Russia’s use of unmanned drones both internally and externally was necessitated by Russia’s fight against Chechnyan terrorism before the Russian - Chech n yan armistice of 2009 1 . The atrocities committed by the Chechnyan terrorists include the bombing of a Moscow movie theater, metro station and an arcade — all civilian populations. Sadly, these attacks are emulated worldwide by other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Real IRA 2 . Drones are absolutely essential , as insurgents worldwide are concealing themselves in failed states in regions of the Middle East and Africa. As acts of self defense and international security from terrorism, the deployment of drones do es not violate human rights. In more recent times, the United States’ government has received criticism for its frequent use of un manned drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan in its fight against terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, having felt the repercussions of terrorism inflicted by radical Islamic groups, Russia understands the need for these attacks coordi nated by the U.S. They have proved to be an effective weapon as demonstrated by the killing of Al Qaeda leader Anwar al Awl aki. Furthermore, unmanned drones allow targeted killings a t little to no risk to government personnel carrying them out, and they can be operated remotely from the home s tate. The Russian gove rnment believes that, to defend oneself, a nation does not need the consent of another nation to deploy unma nned drones on the condition that the other nation is a failed state such as Afghanista n or Somalia which cannot control terrorist activity arising within its own borders . 3 The legality and human rights issue of the deployment of unmanned drones is irrelevant for the purpose of self defense against terrorists. The Special Rapporteur rep ort issued by the Human Rights Council in May of 2010 contains an inherent hypocrisy and naivety which is why Russian officials have chosen not to directly respond to it. The report sets out guidelines for nations to follow in their coordination of ―target ed killings‖. The guidelines of this report are unrealistic in that it would be nearly impossible for a nation to conduct a targeted killing abiding by every single rule. Both the United States and Russia were harshly criticized in the report despite havin g lawfully follow ed a majority of the guidelines in both nations ’ attempt s to eradicate terrorism. For example the report states ― In the absence of consent, or in addition to it, States may invoke the right to self defence as justification for the extrater ritorial use of force involving targeted killings ‖ 4 . It is incontrovertible to state that U.S and Russian detonated attacks have been coordinated in the name of self defense. Russia has used its drones to end the atrocities coordinated by Chechnyan terrorists in their attempt to slaughter civilian populations. Likewise, the majority of U.S deployment of unmanned drones have been retaliatory attacks against Al Qaeda — the masterminds of 9/11. Most of the nations of the world have not felt the repercussions of terrorism like Russia and U.S have. While it is tragic that many Pakistani, Yemeni, Afghan , and Somali citizens have been accidentally killed, Russia believes that the blame falls on the failed governments of those regions 5 . The fact these failed governmen ts cannot control the influx of terrorists into their borders leaves nations threatened by terrorism, such as Russia, Israel, and the U.S, with no choice but to conduct preemptive attacks. Furthermore, the Russian Federation believes that these attacks do not violate the legal rights of those killed due to the fact that self d efense supercedes the due process rights of pernicious insurgents. 6 Overall, Russia believes that nations, in attempt to eradic ate terror ism, should follow many of the guidelines s et out by the Human Rights Council. However, it is unrealistic to believe that a country can conduct an attack while simultaneously abiding by every single law.

#### Nuke war --- they can attack the Sochi border otherwise

McKillop 1-21-14 [Andrew, former expert in policy and programming with the European Commission in Brussels, writes and consults about the impact of oil prices on the economy and currently advises the ECOHABITAT sustainable housing and property development project near the French, Belgium and Luxemburg borders, “The Sochi 2014 Olympics. Theater for Terror and Counter-Terror. Russia’s “Lost Islamic Bomb Lady”,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-sochi-2014-olympics-theater-for-terror-and-counter-terror-russias-lost-islamic-bomb-lady/5365616]

Chechnya has become ever more critical to Kremlin strategists, the front line theater for Russian-Saudi conflict with Sochi an easy ride from its borders. This theater is particularly acute due to the fact that Syria has thousands of fighters who, according to the Russian Spetznaz special services, are a serious and real threat for the country. Ramzan Kadyrov, the former Chechen rebel placed in charge by Kremlin and an adept at counter-terror war, has on many recent occasions said that Islamist insurgents in Chechnya have reached “plague proportions” and in his view are only biding their time before moving north to Russia – and to Europe.¶ Syria Split Could Set Russia Alight¶ State Douma deputy and Foreign relations commission chief Anatoly Ermolin, with a long military track record in Chechnya and the Caucuses during the 1990s bluntly says : “I think this is one of the most dangerous things for any government. They (the Islamists) are very serious and believe they can organize an Islamic state….They consider (Russia) to be their territory. We are dry wood; it’s very easy to set fire to the situation.”¶ Ermolin is openly alarmed and alarmist because he believes the disastrous conflict in Syria divided Russia and NATO-member countries into two camps, with the US-led west leaning to support or at least tolerance of the Islamists, despite the increasingly frenzied extremist nature of Syria’s opposition. For Russia this means it is next in line for destabilization, by Islam under the guise of, and stoked by Western-Russian rivalry and conflict. Ermolin says there can soon be a major realignment of international relations and vital interests.¶ Add the Saudi terror chief, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan (photo, left) into this mix and the fuse is nearly lit. The London Telegraph reported back in October about Saudi Arabia’s under the table offer to Russia for a chance to ‘control the world’s oil market’ in some type of strategic alliance between OPEC and Russia – but only if Russia would wash its hands of the Assad regime in Syria. That was the carrot. The stick was somewhat more barbaric:¶ Bandar threatened to unleash his Chechen terrorists in order to shutdown, and possibly kill civilians at Sochi. He is alleged to have said:¶ ‘‘I can give you a guarantee to protect the Winter Olympics next year. The Chechen groups that threaten the security of the Games are controlled by us’’¶ Beyond Saudi Arabia international racketeering and extortion, in there is fear in Germany, France, the UK and Italy – as there is in Russia, of what happens when thousands of young “jihadis” return from the Syrian war. Russian foreign relations experts like Ermolin say this will be the acid test, and in the Middle East will surely and certainly coincide with the equally rising threat of more open and wider conflict between Sunni Saudi Arabia, and Shia Iran. The dangers of another Iran-Sunni war like the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war are claimed by Russian policy experts to have been completely underestimated in the west. As they and Russian military analysts say, the potential for a repeat of the 1980-88 war “going nuclear” is high.¶ Russian experts also say the dangers of Iran itself destabilizing and “turning to terror” have been ignored or underestimated in the west. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel, backed by the US and several EU countries, especially France give either open or covert support to anti-Iranian Sunni terror movements, making all out Iran-versus-Sunni war the logical follow-up. In the case of Iranian defeat, spillover will, the Russians say, be large scale regional, not contained. As a result, although never stated as a driver for US and European thawing towards Iran, the risk of Iran being destabilized have to be taken seriously.

#### Worst case has already happened

Dove ‘12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so **this** release over the world’s largest city really **represented a worst-case scenario**.¶ **Nobody got sick** or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### No cyber war

Cavelty ’12 (Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Dr. Myriam Dunn Cavelty is Head of the New Risk Research Unit at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland and was Fellow at the “stiftung neue verantwortung” in Berlin, Germany, Center for Security Studies (CSS), “The militarisation of cyber security as a source of global tension”, <http://www.academia.edu/1471717/The_militarisation_of_cyber_security_as_a_source_of_global_tension>, March 29, 2012)

Cyber war remains unlikely Since the potentially devastating effects of cyber attacks are so scary, the temptation is very high not only to think about worst-case scenarios, but also to give them a lot of (often too much) weight despite their very low probability. However, most experts agree that strategic cyber war remains highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, mainly due to the uncertain results such a war would bring, the lack of motivation on the part of the possible combatants, and their shared inability to defend against counterattacks. Indeed, it is hard to see how cyber attacks could ever become truly effective for military purposes: It is exceptionally diffcult to take down multiple, specific targets and keep them down over time. the key difficulty is proper reconnaissance and targeting, as well as the need to deal with a variety of diverse systems and be ready for countermoves from your adversary. Furthermore, nobody can be truly interested in allowing the unfettered proliferation and use of cyber war tools, least of all the countries with the offensive lead in this domain. Quite to the contrary, strong arguments can be made that the world’s big powers have an overall strategic interest in developing and accept- ing internationally agreed norms on cyber war, and in creating agreements that might pertain to the development, distribution, and de- ployment of cyber weapons or to their use (though the effectiveness of such norms must remain doubtful). the most obvious reason is that the countries that are currently openly discussing the use of cyber war tools are precisely the ones that are the most vulnerable to cyber warfare at- tacks due to their high dependency on information infrastructure. the features of the emerging information environment make it extremely unlikely that any but the most limited and tactically oriented instances of computer attacks could be con- tained. More likely, computer at- tacks could ‘blow back’ through the interdependencies that are such an essential feature of the environment. Even relatively harmless viruses and worms would cause considerable random disruption to businesses, governments, and consumers. this risk would most likely weigh much heavier than the uncertain benefits to be gained from cyber war activities.

#### Status quo solves ALL disease outbreaks- US global partnerships

Ritger 2/14 (Clara, staff correspondent for the National Journal, February 14, 2014, “Obama Team Launches Global Partnership Aimed at Battling Pandemics”, http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/obama-team-launches-global-partnership-aimed-at-battling-pandemics-20140213///TS)

The U.S. is launching a worldwide effort to prevent, detect, and respond to the outbreak of infectious diseases. Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius joined Lisa Monaco, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, to announce the Global Health Security Agenda, an effort of 26 nations and three international organizations to stop loss of life, avert serious economic consequences associated with mass infection, and block bioterror threats. "We know that outbreaks anywhere in the world are only a plane ride away," said Laura Holgate, senior director at the National Security Council. Thursday's announcement from the White House mirrors the efforts of the the World Health Organization, which set out International Health Regulations in 2005 in an effort to create a global reporting and response system for public health risks. Less than one in five countries adheres to WHO standards, and Holgate said they're "putting political highlights" on it. "The U.S. is putting resources toward this and others should do the same," she said. Roughly $40 million will come out of existing U.S. resources to support the efforts in 2014 of 10 low- and middle-income countries that are working to meet the International Health Regulations laid out by WHO, according to Tom Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In 2015, Frieden added, the president plans to allocate $45 million to the CDC for the explicit purpose of global health security. There's already promising results in one of the pilot programs the U.S. has launched, according to Frieden. The CDC worked with Uganda—a country that has dealt with numerous outbreaks, including Ebola and cholera—to transport samples from potentially infectious patients for remote testing, and used text messaging to track the cases. The CDC has already measured improvements in lab testing and interoperabillity of information and management systems in Uganda. The goal of the worldwide effort is "to slow the spread of antimicrobial resistance, establish national biosecurity systems, reduce zoonotic disease transmission, increase routine immunization, establish and strengthen national infectious disease surveillance and laboratory systems, and develop real-time electronic reporting systems and emergency operations centers," according to a press release. The White House plans to meet with the nations committed to its health agenda to measure progress this fall.

said.

#### No impact to disease

Posner ‘5 (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1, March 11, 2005)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Drone prolif doesn’t escalate or cause terrorism

**Singh ’12** [Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, an independent and non-partisan organization that focuses on researching and analyzing national security and defense policies, also a research assistant at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America, is a War and Peace Fellow at the Dickey Center, a global research organization, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” 8-13-12, http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/]

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.¶ Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones:¶ – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue.¶ – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose.¶ – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face.¶ – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts.¶ In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### China won’t use drones aggressively- rationality checks

**Erickson and Strange 5-29**-13 [Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange is a researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, “China has drones. Now how will it use them?” <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html>]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it. The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military's tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing's overarching approach remains one of caution - something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone programme.

### Europe Adv.

#### Relations Resilient- despite NSA scandal

Smale 13- Alison Smale is a British journalist. In December 2008, Smale became the Executive Editor of the International Herald Tribune, after being promoted from Managing Editor, making her the first woman to be in charge of the paper. (“Amid New Storm in U.S.-Europe Relationship, a Call for Talks on Spying”, NY Times, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/world/europe/fallout-over-american-spying-revelations.html?pagewanted=1&\_r=1)

BERLIN — While President Obama has tried to soften the blow, this week’s disclosures about the extent of America’s spying on its European allies have added to a series of issues that have sharply eroded confidence in the United States’ leadership at a particularly difficult moment. Related Pawel Kopczynski/Reuters A former National Security Agency listening station in Berlin. Germany and the United States have cooperated to fight terrorism. Readers’ Comments "I find it so deeply saddening how isolated the U.S. has become in a relatively short amount of time by alienating everyone and then innocently wonders why there is so much anti-Americanism out there." Olaf, Germany Read Full Comment » The sharp words from Germany, France and others this week are part of a broader set of frustrations over issues like the Syrian civil war, the danger posed to the global economy by Washington’s fiscal fights and the broader perception that President Obama himself — for all his promises to rebuild relations with allies after the presidency of George W. Bush — is an unreliable partner. This American administration is “misreading and miscalculating the effects” of its deeds in a Europe that is less ready than it once was to heed the United States, said Annette Heuser, executive director of the Bertelsmann Foundation, a research organization in Washington. Early on Friday, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President François Hollande of France emerged from a meeting of European leaders to call for talks with the United States on new rules for their intelligence relationship. A statement from the European leaders said a “lack of trust” could undermine trans-Atlantic intelligence cooperation. Earlier in the week the European Parliament had acted to suspend an agreement with the United States that allows it to track the finances of terrorist groups, citing suspicions that the United States authorities were tapping European citizens’ personal financial data. The disclosures contained in the documents leaked by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward J. Snowden have crystallized a growing sense in Europe that post-Sept. 11 America has lost some of the values of privacy and accountability that have been the source of the world’s admiration for its version of democracy. So fierce was the anger in Berlin over suspicions that American intelligence had tapped into Ms. Merkel’s cellphone that Elmar Brok of Germany, the chairman of the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee and a pillar of trans-Atlantic exchanges since 1984, spoke Friday of America’s security establishment as a creepy “state within a state.” Since Sept. 11, 2001, he said, “the balance between freedom and security has been lost.” To be sure, the United States and Europe are like a bickering couple that will never break up. For all the sharp words, they cannot even begin to contemplate an actual divorce. Many of the European complaints about the United States also seem directed mainly at a domestic audience, and may not result in concrete changes to a relationship that has weathered many storms.

#### Obama cant handle international strategies- he’s running out the clock

**Carafano 1-21**-14 [James Jay Carafano is vice president of defense and foreign policy issues at The Heritage Foundation, “Obama's Foreign Policy to Nowhere,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamas-foreign-policy-nowhere-9741?page=show]

Sir Hew Strachan, an advisor to the Chief of the British Defense Staff, made some ripples across the pond with his judgment on the U.S. president’s foreign policy. “Obama has no sense of what he wants to do in the world,” Strachan said.¶ Coming from a world-class military historian, it was a stunning rebuke.¶ Strachan gives Mr. Obama’s Middle East policy, specifically his muddled approach to Syria, two thumbs down. Obama's initiative there, he says, has taken the situation on the ground "backwards instead of forwards." That’s just one conclusion he delivers in his forthcoming book, The Direction of War, which evaluates how modern political leaders utilize strategy.¶ Portraying Obama as the Inspector Clouseau of foreign policy may pump Strachan's book sales. (After all, it worked for Gates.) But his assessment seems a bit off the mark.¶ Since the start of his second term, Mr. Obama has exhibited a pretty clear idea of what he wants to do in the world—and that is to have as little as possible to do with it until he gets out of office. The President's primary objective appears to be "no more Benghazis"—just ride out the second term, go build a library, and then mimic the line of his first former defense secretary: “Hey, everything was fine when I left!”¶ A penchant for risk-aversion seems to be the chief hallmark of U.S. foreign policy today. The "red line" over Syria’s use of chemical weapons, a particular target of Strachan's academic scorn, is a case in point. It was a way of doing nothing about that nation’s spiraling civil war. No one appeared more unprepared than the president when it turned out that the red line would actually require the U.S. to get engaged. Likewise, leaping at the chemical weapons deal was all too predictable. It offered the White House a quick exit from getting drawn more deeply into the conflict.¶ But Obama faces an enduring dilemma. As Syria showed, while he might want to leave the world alone, the world doesn't seem to feel the same way about the United States. There is just too much time left in office to coast till the end, pack up the Nobel Prize, and move back to Hawaii. The Oval Office has found it has to do something to fill the vacuum, opening space for other influences to drive foreign affairs—as long as they don’t push the president too far from his chosen path.¶ So a second vector has sprouted up to drive the direction of U.S. foreign policy, one not too far from the president's heart: an infatuation with multilateral process. This scratches Mr. Obama's progressive itch. It is an item of progressive faith that, as long as we’re “engaged in a process" and mean well, we must be making progress. Thus, multilateral process became the fallback solution for Syria, once the red line gave way. The U.S. is currently engaged in multiparty talks about Syria in Geneva. Likewise, the administration is upbeat about “progress” between the Israelis and the Palestinians, because Secretary of State John Kerry has worked hard to get peace "talks" going again. And then, there is the ultimate bright, shiny object: nuclear talks with Iran.¶ A third vector is emerging as well: a kind of magical thinking among administration officials which holds that vectors one and two are actually working so well that, by the end of the president’s term, the entire Middle East will have been transformed. So, for example, there is happy talk that engagement with Iran will lead to working with Tehran on helping the US disengage from Afghanistan, settle things down in Iraq, and end the war in Syria.¶ For now the president seems happy to bundle these three vectors to guide what he sees as his coherent vision of a low-risk, run-out-the-clock strategy.¶ Contrary to what Strachan asserts, the president does have a sense of what he is doing. The president's only problem is there are no signs that the three vectors are converging on anything that makes the region look like the land of milk and honey.¶ The odds of the Geneva talks playing a decisive role in resolving the Syrian civil war grow longer by the day. Vicious infighting among the insurgent groups and ramped-up support for the Assad regime by Moscow and Tehran are far more likely to drive the outcome. The "best case” scenario thus is a Balkanized Syria, with an Al Qaeda safe haven, huge displaced populations, and an occasional stream of car bombings from Damascus to Beirut.¶ As for Iran, while the administration thinks it has bought six months of "wait and see," the reality is that, when the clock stops ticking, the West will be no more confident it can shut down an Iranian nuclear program than it is now. Meanwhile, the once-effective sanctions regime will have fallen apart, and the long sought U.S.-Iranian rapprochement will remain but the stuff of dreams.¶ Meanwhile, the president's policy of disengagement from Iraq is shaping up like a disaster. It is reaffirming Henry Kissinger's truism, "Unilateral withdrawal is not victory." And the Israeli-Palestinian peace process remains moribund. There are no talks, just U.S. officials talking about talks. If Egypt successfully implements its new constitution, elects a government, and puts the Arab Spring back on course, it will be no thanks to a White House that has vacillated between displaying complete indifference and casting annoying catcalls from the sidelines. Strachan's explanation may be off, but the result is the same. It’s hard to see the vectors of Obama's foreign policy leading anywhere but nowhere.

#### US cred strategies fail and heg doesn’t solve war anymore- doesn’t solve China war

**Mazarr ’12** [Michael J. Mazarr is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf]

A third trend is declining U.S. military predominance and a fast-approaching moment when **the U**nited **S**tates **will be unable to project power into key regions** of the world. The reasons are partly technologicalrising actors have burgeoning capabilities in anti-ship missiles, drones, or other ‘‘area denial’’ structures.13 Moreover, actors have also found other ways to counter American power: major states like China or Russia now possess the ability, through financial, space, or energy means, to threaten massive global consequences in response to unwanted U.S. force. This includes cyber mayhem: as one recent survey concluded, cyber weapons ‘‘allow, for the first time in history, small states with minimal¶ defense budgets to inflict serious harm on a vastly stronger foe at extreme ranges,’’¶ a new form of vulnerability that would ‘‘greatly constrain America’s use of force abroad.’’14 An important new RAND report by Paul Davis and Peter Wilson¶ warns of an ‘‘impending crisis in defense planning’’ arising ‘‘from technology¶ diffusion that is leveling aspects of the playing field militarily, geostrategic¶ changes, and the range of potential adversaries.’’15 These challenges are¶ exacerbated by a crisis of defense procurement; **America’s leading**-edge military **systems are becoming less affordable and reliable**. Aircraft carriers, for example, have become prohibitively expensive, with costs set to break through¶ congressionally-imposed limits next year.16 The systems that undergird U.S. military primacy are being whittled down to a small handful that no president will readily risk in anything but the most essential of crises. A fourth threat to U.S. global strategy is that America’s non-military tools of influence have proven incapable of achieving key U.S. goals in the areas nominated as the leading security challenges of the future, transnational, substate threats, and the risks emanating from fragile states. While states have¶ well-established theories for pursuing traditional political-military ends with¶ diplomacy and force, the United States possesses no proven models for achieving progress in the social, psychological, and environmental costs of an integrating globe, areas such as regional instability, terrorism, the complexities of development, radicalism, aggressive nationalism, organized crime, resource shortages, and ecological degradation.17 For half a century, the United States¶ was a dominant global power which identified challenging core goals and tasks, deterring military adventurism, building political-military alliances, erecting¶ mutually-beneficial institutions of tradebut to which Washington could apply¶ established models and techniques. U.S. leadership and power becomes much¶ more problematic in a world of complex problems which generate no broad¶ agreement and which subject themselves to no clear solutions

# 2NC

## CP

### 2NC Impact Run

#### Chinese soft power outweighs the case-

#### Magnitude- prevents East Asian instability and is key to Chinese self- restraint in key hotspots- escalates to nuclear war and draws in the US

#### Goes nuclear and CBMs don’t check

**Wittmeyere ‘13** [Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyere, Assistant Editor at Foreign Policy, degree from London School of Economics and Political Science, “Why Japan and China Could Accidentally End Up at War,” <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/why-japan-and-china-could-accidentally-end-up-at-war/>]

Great. At a time when Chinese authorities seem to be making efforts to dial down tensions with Japan over disputed islands, could a war between East Asian superpowers be sparked by accident -- by some frigate commander gone rogue? That nuclear war could come about in just such a scenario was, of course, a major concern during the Cold War. But decades of tension, as well as apocalyptic visions of global annihilation as a result of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. locking horns, produced carefully designed systems to minimize the damage any one rogue actor could inflict (only the president can access the nuclear codes), and to minimize misunderstandings from more minor incidents (the Kremlin-White House hotline). But East Asia -- relatively free of military buildup until recently -- doesn't have these same systems in place. A soon-to-be-released report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies highlights the danger that emerges when a region's military systems develop faster than its communication mechanisms, and finds that accidental war in East Asia is a real possibility: "Across East Asia, advanced military systems such as anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced combat aircraft are proliferating in a region lacking security mechanisms that could defuse crises. Bilateral military-to-military ties are often only embryonic. There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and escalation, particularly in the absence of a strong tradition of military confidence-building measures." The Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands dispute has been marked by an increasing number of deliberate provocations on both sides: surveillance vessels entering nearby waters, patrol planes making passes by the islands, scrambled fighter jets. These are planned actions, designed to incrementally heighten tensions. But the more fighter jets that get scrambled without good communications systems in place, the higher the chances that these deliberate moves escalate beyond what either Japan or China is anticipating.

#### Probability- East Asia is a unique escalation risk- academic consensus

**Jimin ’13** [Chen Jimin, Ph.D, is an Assistant Research Fellow for the Institute for International and Strategic Studies at the Party School of Central Committee of C.P.C., “Solving the Northeast Asia Security Dilemma,” May 10, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/solving-the-northeast-asia-security-dilemma/>]

**Northeast Asia is one of the most complex, fragile regions in the global security landscape**. The regional security dilemma is concentrated and intensive, and is generated by a complex and tangled mix of historical issues, ideological factors and disputes over real interests. Consider the region’s recent history, which features more than its share of turmoil and strife. The ruptures have left Northeast Asia with lingering issues such as territorial disputes between China and Japan and South Korea and Japan, and division on the Korean Peninsula. Japanese attitudes towards history are among the core variables that influence its relations with China and South Korea. Recently, members of Japan’s Cabinet paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, arousing strong protests from China, South Korea and other Asian countries. Clearly, historical factors have important and obvious impacts on the current political landscape in Northeast Asia. As do ideological factors. The Cold War was in part the struggle of competing ideologies between the United States and the Soviet Union. But this struggle has outlived the Cold War. The current security tensions in Northeast Asia are still exacerbated by a Cold War mentality and its manifestation in the U.S. alliance system in Asia. To some degree, the strong U.S. presence in the region contributes to the increased security dilemma. Take the North Korean nuclear crisis, which Pyongyang claims is driven by the absence of a guarantee of its national security. For North Korea, a reliable nuclear deterrent is an effective means of safeguarding its own national security. Essentially, the key to the North Korean nuclear issue is still the lack of safety and security.¶ Third, there are disputes involving real interests among major Northeast Asia countries. Most entail core interests of territorial sovereignty, which narrows the scope for coordination among the nations involved. Nationalist sentiment in these countries runs high, especially on issues of sovereignty. As modern nations, these states see serving the interests and aspirations of their peoples as an important source of legitimacy. For this reason, decision makers tend to be heavily influenced by public emotions, which may lead to irrational policies. Meanwhile, a number of countries in Northeast Asia have faced economic difficulties in the wake of the global financial crisis. In some cases, political parties have resorted to inciting nationalist sentiment against neighboring countries, to the detriment of relations within the region.¶ Given these factors, a multifacted approach is needed to resolve the security dilemma in Northeast Asia. First, the countries involved should squarely confront their histories, even as they look to the future. All countries should of course calmly rethink the lessons of the past, but this is particularly important for a country that has caused immense suffering among the people of Asia within its modern history.¶ Building on this, the region should then turn its attention to the future, go forward and work together to build a long-term, stable security mechanism. To a larger extent, dealing with the historical issues that exist between Northeast Asian countries, including factual disputes and issues of mentalities, is the first step toward a new security relationship among Northeast Asian countries.¶ Second, we must dispense with a Cold War mentality and seek mutual assured security (MAS). Whether in theory or in practice, the zero-sum approach of the Cold War has been proven to be obsolete. The policies of power against power are not conducive to regional stability and prosperity; rather, common, cooperative, and collective security based on a commitment to MAS are the most useful means for keeping the peace within the region. Any actor wanting to bolster its own security at the expense of another's, pursuing so-called absolute security, is bound to find it counterproductive.¶ Third, we must strengthen multi-level exchanges, reducing the risk of miscalculation. At present, the academic community has formed a basic consensus, namely on the lack of a Northeast Asia security mechanism, which is largely reflected in the absence of any effective, comprehensive, institutional exchange mechanism among Northeast Asian countries. As a result, the risk of strategic misjudgment increases, especially at times of crisis. Therefore, to build a Northeast Asia security mechanism, we first need to create institutionalized channels of communication, at both non-governmental and government levels. Mutual understanding and trust between peoples is the most reliable guarantee of harmonious relations between nations.

#### Chinese influence solves global problems and warfare

**Chengde ’13** [Yen, research Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies on Sino-US relations, “Achievements and Challenges of China’s Diplomacy in 2012,” <http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-06/03/content_6001789.htm>]

China’s diplomacy achieved success after success, and China has begun appearing on the international political center stage, playing a decisive role in regional and world affairs. There are many reasons for this. The main reasons are as follows:¶ ¶ 1. Rising national strength¶ Recently Chinese leader in an important speech Xi Jinping pointed out: “If we are backward, we’ll be bullied. Development is the only road to self-reliance.” In today’s world, power politics remain prevalent. China has always opposed power politics, never engaged in power politics, and never allowing other countries to engage in power politics. In defiance of hegemonic powers, China has maintained its own independence, sovereignty, and security, and has constantly achieved diplomatic breakthroughs. That is mainly because China has resorted to self-reliance, that is, its growing national strength and national power.¶ In the 30-plus years since the reform and opening-up drive started, China experienced a golden age of development, with an economic growth rate of 9.7% on average. During the 10 year period between 2002 and 2011, its average annual economic growth rate was 10.7%, four times that of the United States over the same period. The share of China’s economic output in the world’s total rose from 4.4% to 10%, making China the world’s second largest source of economic output. Moreover, it has continuously narrowed its gap with the United States, the largest economy. In 2000, China’s GDP was only one-tenth that of the United States. But in 2011, China’s GDP reached 47.3 trillion yuan, or about $7.4 trillion, equivalent to 48% of the U.S. GDP. In 2012, China’s economic growth slowed, but still maintained an average growth rate of 7.7% in the first three quarters of the year. Its growth for the whole year was expected to exceed the growth target of 7.5%, 3.5 times U.S. economic growth for the same year. China’s total economic output for 2012 is expected to reach half of the total U.S. economy. Experts predict that by 2030 China’s total economic output is likely to surpass that of the United States, becoming the world’s largest economy. As early as in 2007, China’s economic contribution to the global economic growth had overtaken that of the United States, becoming the main engine of world economic growth. In 2011, China’s total foreign trade amounted to $3.68 trillion, making it the world’s second largest foreign trade country. Its gap with the United States, the world’s largest foreign trade country, in the same year, was only $44.76 billion. In 2012, China’s foreign trade grew much faster than that of the United States, and China is expected to surpass the United States as the world’s largest foreign trade country. By the end of October 2012, China’s foreign exchange reserves had reached $3.29 trillion, accounting for one-third of the total global foreign exchange reserves. China’s science, technology, and national defense capabilities have continued to make significant progress. Meanwhile, China has also rapidly increased its soft power, raising its comprehensive national strength to a new level. With its 30-plus years of rapid development, China has created “a wonder of the world.” Its road to development has been highly praised by the international community. Its growing strength has provided material support to China’s diplomatic victories.¶ ¶ 2. Correct policies Peace and development are China’s top policy priorities. Historically, major powers rose by resorting to war and external expansion. Such countries were certain to pursue hegemony. But China has broken this model and created a new development approach: peaceful rise by relying on its own internal motivation and pursuing mutually beneficial, opening-up strategies; that is, socialism with Chinese characteristics. China will never seek hegemony, engage in power politics, or pursue expansionism. Therefore, China does not seek an alliance with other countries, does not organize military blocs, does not pursue a strategic relationship with a foreign country against a third-party, and does not establish foreign military bases. Except in UN peacekeeping operations, China does not station any soldier abroad, which eliminates the fundamental obstacle to the development of China’s foreign relations and creates growing potential for Chinese diplomatic activities. China’s independent foreign policy of peace is an integral part of its road of peaceful development and a manifestation of its diplomacy. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is a fundamental principle guiding China’s foreign policy. As one of the countries to initiate the “Five Principles” and apply them with dedication, China has always respected other countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, has never violated the sovereignty of other countries, has never interfered in the internal affairs of other countries, and has vigorously conducted mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries, achieving peaceful coexistence. In 2012, in view of the evolving international and regional situations, China implemented the “Five Principles” with three salient features. First, China put greater emphasis on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and stressed respect for countries to choose a road to development suitable for their own national conditions. China strongly objected to the superpower’s attempts to interfere in China’s internal affairs, to criticize China’s social system, and to introduce the “Arab Spring” troubles to China. Meanwhile, China was critical of the Western powers for their attempts at the new interventionism in the Middle East and other places. When vetoing three times a Western-led resolution on Syria which aimed to implement a “regime change,” China argued that the Syria issue should be peacefully settled through political dialogue. China’s efforts prevented the U.S.-led Western powers from repeating the “Libyan model” in Syria. China safeguarded the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international justice, prevented the West from instigating a “domino effect”-style “regime change” in Arab countries, and maintained peace and stability in the Middle East, playing a unique and universally acknowledged role. ¶ Secondly, China valued the principle of peacefully settling international disputes. As international and regional tensions grew, a number of international disputes intensified, and military confrontations developed. China urged the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations and dialogues, stressing that that was the only correct approach to safeguarding international and regional peace and development, and to protecting the fundamental interests of all parties. With this rationale, China in 2012 vigorously emphasized the role of the peaceful settlement in international disputes, and accordingly strengthened its efforts to promote talks and facilitate peace. For example, China insisted that the North Korea and Iran nuclear issues can be resolved only by political and peaceful means. It opposed vigorous sanctions against North Korea and Iran, strongly resisting attempts to resort to force or threats of force against the two countries. By its active participation in the six-party talks mechanism over the nuclear issue, and its vigorous mediation between North Korea and the parties concerned, China facilitated talks and negotiations, easing the strained relations between North Korea and other sides, and preventing a confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. With regard to its own island territorial disputes with the countries concerned, China firmly safeguarded its territorial integrity and sovereignty, while remaining calm, exercising restraint, and resorting to moderation instead of pre-emptive action. In addition, China held negotiations with Japan and the Philippines, and held a high-level dialogue with Vietnam, easing tensions and avoiding conflict and confrontation. In fact, China has maintained steady bilateral relations with most of the neighbors with which China has territorial disputes. Meanwhile, China was also actively involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world. It made efforts to ease tensions in African countries (such as those between Sudan and South Sudan) and in the border areas between Lebanon and Israel, preventing the outbreak of conflict and war. These outstanding efforts have earned China praise from the United Nations and the relevant countries. ¶ Thirdly, China paid more attention to, and actively implemented, the principles of cooperation with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Because of the recessions in the European Union and Japan, as well as the economic downturn in the U.S., in 2012 the world economic recovery was weak, undergoing a marked decline in growth. Therefore, there was an urgent need for countries to strengthen and expand their economic exchanges and cooperation in order to promote global economic recovery. Adhering to principles of equality, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation, China made efforts to strengthen its economic cooperation with other countries, helping mitigate the global economic difficulties. For example, Chinese leaders actively participated in various multilateral summits and promoted global economic cooperation and regional integration. They also continued to vigorously urge countries to ride out the storm by helping each other to eliminate the aftermath of the financial crisis and to achieve a strong, sustainable, and balanced growth of the global economy. China helped the EU to ease its debt crisis by taking strong measures, including expanding the imports from the EU countries, purchasing EU bonds, and offering large-scale capital to the IMF to help enhance its ability to resolve the debt crisis. Moreover, China strengthened its mutually beneficial cooperation with the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In particular, it increased aid efforts to the least developed countries and China-Africa economic and trade relations made particularly significant progress. In 2011, the trade volume reached a record $166.3 billion. But in 2012 it was expected to undergo another round of rapid growth and exceed the mark of $200 billion. In July 2012, President Hu announced at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that China would adopt five measures to support Africa’s development, including expanding aid and offering $20 billion in loans to African countries.¶ Chinese sages have a saying: “If a small country has a big policy, it will be a big power; if a big country has a small policy, it will be a small power.” In other words, if the policy of a small country is “big” (in accordance with the times), it can act as a big power; if the policy of a big country is “small” (lacking perspective), it can only play a small role. This shows that a country’s foreign policy has profound implications for its international status and role. China’s foreign policy is in line with the trend of the times, reflects the common interests of China and the world, and is an important guarantee for China to achieve high prestige and diplomatic success.

### Read

#### China is a better model for global stability

**Hussain ‘13** [Murtaza Hussain, MA, Toronto-based writer and analyst focused on issues related to Middle Eastern politics, Wealth Operations Officer for TD Bank Group, “Why China might be a better superpower,” http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201362584334716870.html]

In the place of the former colonial forces such as England and France, however, today, sits the US, the world's only remaining military superpower. While since the fall of the Soviet Union the US has been widely considered to be the preeminent nation globally, in recent years it has fallen into an observable malaise.¶ Due to its wars of aggression, institutionalised torture, unaccountable assassination programmes and general contempt for the rule of law, the American government has today sacrificed whatever was once considered admirable about its role in international affairs. Furthermore, it is fast sacrificing what was once most admirable about it domestically, as once-cherished civil liberties are being forfeited and its citizens are being compelled to submit to an opaque and pervasive surveillance state.¶ While China is far less free domestically, in international affairs the country continues to ascend both economically and in terms of international influence. It is thus worth asking, is this a positive development for the world at large? Could China be a more responsible, less violent and more constructive superpower than the US?¶ Historical contrasts¶ Over its history, the US has undoubtedly provided much for the betterment of mankind in the fields of science, arts, good governance and human development. The country continues to produce some of the most exceptional contributors in all these areas, and for all the cruel excesses of the US government the American people are among the most generous, hospitable and high-achievingpopulation in the world. The US is by no means a monolith and its impressive ideological diversity continues to be one of its enduring strengths. However, while the US was founded on the principle of national self-determination, throughout its history, its foreign policy has been based on denying that same right to others around the globe. From the early 20th century invasions and occupations of the Philippines and Haiti, the CIA coups against democratic governments in Iran and Chile, up to the near genocidal military onslaughts against the Vietnamese and Iraqi people, the US - in a relatively short time frame - has left a trail of destruction around the world which is without parallel in human history.¶ While couched in the deeply cynical rhetoric of freedom and democracy, the body count left by US militarism and colonial exploitation runs to millions. It has been well-documented that what has motivated these brutally malicious policies (aside from naked greed) is a crude sense of racism and a chauvinistic belief in "Manifest Destiny" - the same ruthlessly imperialistic ideology which helped justify the holocaust committed against the indigenous people of the Americas and which drove the Atlantic slave trade.¶ China, despite existing as a unified country 4,000 years longer than the US, conspicuously does not have such a history of invading and subjugating the inhabitants of far-flung lands. While it has had its share of localised conflicts, there is nothing in its history - even over the many centuries during which China was as at the peak of its historical power - that is remotely comparable to the industrialised exploitation and mass-murder which has characterised the Western colonial project.¶ Despite being one of the wealthiest and powerful countries on earth for most of its existence, China's relationship with the outside world has traditionally been characterised more by Sino-centric inertia and peaceable exchange than by armed pillage and the export of violence to foreign lands. As surmised by the famed 19th century scholar of Buddhism, Zhang Taiyin:¶ "Asian countries… rarely invaded one another and treated each other respectfully with the Confucian virtue of benevolence."¶ While China has in many ways been torn from its traditional culture by traumatic recent encounters with Western imperialist powers and the subsequent upheavals of Mao's Cultural Revolution, the country's traditionally harmonious worldview ("harmony" being a recurring theme in Chinese political culture) is still seen in modern China's global relations.¶ China's peaceful rise¶ To achieve its foreign policy goals in Iraq, the US embarked on a decades-long campaign of violence against the Iraqi people which culminated in the brutal invasion and occupation of the country in 2003. While the US succeeded in destroying the lives of millions of innocent Iraqi civilians, it failed to create an outcome which was of benefit to it and ultimately left the country with its influence and prestige greatly eroded.¶ China, however, has in many ways emerged as the "winner" of the Iraq war, as it is today by far the biggest beneficiary of Iraqi crude oil contracts. In stark contrast to the US primitive and brutal approach to the country, China has used soft-power to great effect and is now the most influential commercial player in the country's oil boom.¶ Thanks to its efforts China is today recognised as a major investor in the future of Iraq. According to the New York Times, Chinese executives are now even impressing their Iraqi counterparts by speaking with them in flawless, Iraqi-accented Arabic.¶ The contrast between China's culturally sensitive approach and the contemptuous and violent attitude taken by the US in Iraq cannot be overstated. In fact, these contrasts are in many ways a reflection of the differing worldviews and historical backgrounds of the two countries.¶ While the US seems committed to exert imperial hegemony over the Middle East using brute military force and punitive economic blockades against civilians, China has publically committed to a policy of "peacefully rising" and has built mutually beneficial and respectful relationships throughout the region.¶ While Chinese polices are no less self-interested, the country's forthright pragmatism is a refreshing alternative to the blatantly cynical and manipulative moralising rhetoric of Western powers. Shallow accusations of Chinese colonialism in Africa (based on Chinese commercial investments in the region) appear borne more of Western fears of Chinese power than of legitimate concerns about African self-determination. ¶ Evidence suggests that China's influence in Africa has been built on the basis of mutual economic interest and its investments have coincided with historically unprecedented economic growth among the people of the continent. The contrast with the unrelentingly murderous and rapacious history of actual Western colonialism in Africa could not be starker.¶ A multipolar world¶ China today is a burgeoning player in global affairs, making forays into the Israel/Palestine conflict, taking material steps to confront environmental issues and pushing its "soft-power" approach to international relations to new lengths. In the face of its rising stature many pundits and political figures have attempted to harp upon the inevitable growing pains of any rising power and cite this as evidence of its immaturity.¶ While China is by no measure perfect, for years the country and its people have been unjustly demonised by those whose own hands are caked in the blood of untold number of innocents. Allegations of purported Chinese malevolence should be viewed for what they most often are - the hysterical propaganda of those who are fearful and insecure about competition for their own privileged position.¶ The US however should not fear the rising tide of Chinese influence. Rather, it should warmly welcome it. In a unipolar world, the US government was free to act out its most self-destructive tendencies and was devoid of any pressure to reform in order to compete with a major adversary. Indeed, the US achieved its most admirable feats when it was facing serious competition from Soviet Russia.¶ While China is not yet a large enough player to individually balance the US on most major issues, its status is rising. When working within the emerging "BRICS" bloc of countries, it is capable of constraining unilateral US actions. This is good for both the American and Chinese people, as the existence of a multipolar world will mean that neither government will be able to delve into unchecked excess and military adventurism.¶ However, as China's relationship with the US and other major powers develops, there is no doubt that the country has finally come to equal terms with its former oppressors. China's ascendance signifies the fruition of Tagore's prophecy and the long victory of the Chinese people over Western imperialism.¶ If China continues its remarkably successful policy of "peacefully rising" while pursuing continued self-improvement and reform, it will remain both a welcome player in global affairs and a responsible model for other aspiring world powers.

### read

#### Chinese influence solves global conflict

**Guangjin ’12** [Cheng, MA in International Relations from the University of Bristol, reporter for China Daily, former news assistant for the Malaysian National News Agency, “China cements role as global mediator,” 12-28-12, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-12/28/content_16063383.htm>]

Editor's note: The year 2012 saw China more actively involved in regional and international affairs, making a bigger contribution to sustainable development and to global peace and prosperity. Although certain challenges and difficulties will continue in 2013, China should take on more responsibilities in the area of global governance, analysts told China Daily.¶ In a strife-torn world burdened by a global economic downturn, China has become more deeply involved in the resolution of regional and international conflicts, indicating its emergence as a mediator.¶ Since the "Arab Spring", China has used its veto power several times in the United Nations Security Council and played a constructive role in the mediation of the ongoing crisis in Syria.¶ China is one of the six parties involved in the talks on the Iranian nuclear issue and has been a major contributor to the recovery from the global economic crisis.¶ The size of China's economy and its growing influence on the world stage have gradually molded the country into a mediator in regional and international issues, analysts said.¶ "As the largest developing economy, China should assume more responsibility in global governance," said Yu Keping, deputy director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee.¶ In recent years, the Chinese government and academics have paid increasing attention to how China should participate in the governance of international affairs, Yu said at a forum in Beijing recently.¶ More participation in such issues within its capability will also help China maintain a peaceful environment, which is necessary for its own development, many analysts said.¶ In the past year, China's mediation efforts paid off in working toward a resolution of the crisis in Syria, although some critics said China's mediation role runs counter to its non-interference principle.¶ The Chinese government sent Li Huaxin, its special envoy and former ambassador to Syria, to the area twice within a month, between February and March, this year to mediate among the countries and parties concerned as tension escalated.¶ In the visit to Syria from March 6 to 7, Li met both Syrian government officials and heads of opposition groups and urged the Syrian government and all parties concerned to immediately halt the violence.¶ Not long before the two-day visit, Li visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, where he exchanged views on the situation in Syria with leaders of these countries and the Arab League.¶ Also in March, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Ming visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France as the Chinese government's special envoy, in an effort to push for a just, peaceful and appropriate settlement of the Syrian issue.¶ This is a big change in China's foreign policy practice, said Hong Kong-based commentator Liu Heping in an interview with Shenzhen TV.¶ According to Liu, in past decades, when a crisis happened in another country, China's usual practice was to call for restraint from the parties involved and to form a peaceful resolution through dialogue, but not to take concrete action.¶ However, in the Syria crisis, China has sent special envoys to mediate. Liu especially pointed out the word "urge" used by the envoy, which indicated a change in China's diplomatic style of absolute non-interference.¶ China has initiated and been adhering to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" for the last 60 years. "Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs" is one of the principles.¶ Liu noted that the nature of China's active participation in trying to resolve the Syria crisis is different from the intervention of some Western countries, as China respects Syria's sovereignty.¶ "The mediation is also based on China's role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and responds to the calls for it to become a responsible big power," Liu said.¶ "Non-interference in each other's internal affairs does not mean doing nothing," said Wu Sike, China's special envoy to the Middle East.¶ China has forged an image of a trustworthy and responsible country by adhering to its principles and showing flexibility when dealing with various problems according to the actual situations in international forums such as the UN, Wu wrote in an article published in People's Daily.¶ In the past decade, China has been stepping up efforts to help resolve regional and international issues with the appointments of special envoys and representatives to several areas, including the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and Africa.¶ Wang Shijie, China's first special envoy to the Middle East, was appointed in 2002.¶ Wang said the appointment was in accordance with China's increasing power and growing influence in world affairs.¶ "Some Middle East countries have asked for China to play a bigger role in the region and urged the Chinese government to send a special envoy," Wang told Wenhui Daily in Shanghai.¶ "The fact that the Chinese government decided to appoint me as the special envoy to the Middle East shows China's concerns about the Middle East issue and its support for a Middle East peace process."¶ Whether China's mediating efforts contradict its principle of "non-interference in internal affairs" has been questioned not only in the Middle East but also in Africa.¶ Liu Guijin served as the first special envoy of the Chinese government on African affairs from 2007 to 2012 and witnessed the independence of South Sudan in 2011.¶ Liu responded to such a question during an online interview with Xinhua News Agency, saying there is no contradiction between China's mediation efforts and its non-interference policy in the process of the independence of South Sudan.¶ "Adhering to the non-interference principle doesn't mean that we cannot give suggestions to Sudan and analyze the situation with relevant parties," Liu said.¶ "What's more important is that we are not doing this with big sticks. We didn't threaten them with stopping trade or not doing business with them if they didn't do what we said. We never do that," Liu said.¶ China's relative absence from contemporary international mediation initiatives since its founding in 1949 is "likely a consequence of the non-interference principle", said Wu Xiaohui, former associate of the international security program at Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.¶ However, driven by its "increasing international status, coupled with the intensification of unresolved and newly emerging conflicts that are threatening its own as well as world security", gradual changes have taken place in its growing mediation efforts, Wu wrote in an article published in the Conflict Resolution Quarterly.¶ A Confucianism and Taoism-based value system, to which the concepts of relationship and "harmony and cooperation" are fundamental, are the wellsprings of China's mediation culture, she said.¶ "China opposes hegemonism and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion," said President Hu Jintao in the report at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November.¶ "China will continue to keep in mind both the interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of the people of all countries, get more actively involved in international affairs, play its role of a major responsible country and work jointly with other countries to meet global challenges," Hu said, setting out a vision for future leaders of China.

#### Chinese soft power is booming- beating the US despite controversies

**Leitch 2-2**-14 [Simon, PhD, did his thesis on Chinese soft power, expert on International Relations, “China’s Growing Influence: The Role of its Soft Power,” http://alochonaa.com/2014/02/03/chinas-growing-influence-the-role-of-its-soft-power/]

The rise of China has become one of the most discussed features of international politics in the 21st century, and policymakers and media pundits around the world are involved in an unending debate about the near-term and long-term significance of China’s return to great power status. Analysts are captivated by China’s growing military potential, its cyber-weapons, its space program, its assertive nationalism and its growing economic leverage over its neighbors and trading partners. These are all interesting issues to be sure, but an underrated element of China’s rise has been its rising “soft power” assets.¶ For most academics to have soft power means having the ability to persuade others to want what you want, or to attract them to your cause through the strength of your argument or legitimacy of your actions. Of course, bribes and threats are a form of power often used in international politics (and often used by China) but threats and brides are sometimes clumsy weapons to use. By crafting and advertising policies in such a way as they appear legitimate to outsiders, and by cultivating a positive national image, a state can operate with fewer barriers, less resistance and less resentment.¶ Chinese soft power has grown rapidly in recent years. Thirty years ago China’s only friends in the West were those seeking to use China as a counterweight to Soviet ambitions in Asia, or those members of the radical left who were duped into believing that communism was liberation. Today the story is different. Global public opinion surveys continue to show that China is perceived fairly favorably by large swathes of the world’s populace, from the Asia-Pacific to Africa and Europe. China has garnered cooperation from a diverse group of states in areas such as trade, tourism, education and infrastructure development, and Chinese statesmen are sure to be given a warm welcome in almost any foreign capital. These developments are both causes and effects of Chinese soft power.¶ Beijing has been working on enhancing its soft power for many years and is equipped with increasingly well-oiled soft power machinery. By opening China to tourism, foreign students and journalists whilst at the same time restricting foreign access to “approved” places the PRC has been able to present its best face to the world. With a tightly controlled state media and highly disciplined and knowledgeable spokespersons, the information flow out of China is carefully monitored, filtered and disseminated with the aim of projecting a positive image of China and the ruling regime. Foreign journalists and academics who propagate negative images of China are denied access for the future, and though such Chinese policies may themselves blur the lines between hard and soft power they do, in the end, contribute enormously to soft power assets by altering how it is permissible to discuss China in international society. Whereas Western politicians and journalists seem perfectly happy to label Kim Jong-un or various Iranian leaders as dictators, the government in Beijing has acquired a measure of legitimacy unheard of for a nominally communist state.¶ The coming of the digital age, marked by greater computerization and the mass utilization of the internet, has had important consequences for the exercise of soft power. Although Beijing has been adept at digital censorship it is important to note how Beijing has embraced the internet and new media to promote its message. Through translated press releases and dedicated foreign language broadcasts the PRC has challenged negative interpretations of its policies, advertised the positives of China’s development, reached out to foreign constituents and argued its position in international disputes. Beijing now employs professional lobbyists in foreign capitals and it has been effective in promoting its self-serving version of history (to both foreign and domestic audiences) in a way few other major states can. China paints itself as a victim of foreign aggression, and has helped perpetuate an influential discourse about China’s traditional culture and foreign policy which provide a convenient justification for its lack of democratization and territorial claims alike.¶ As China has grown more powerful and the United States has staggered under the weight of financial and political stagnation, the PRC has begun to offer itself as an alternative model of government for others to emulate, and as an alternative to the United States as a great power partner. China’s veto powers in the UN and its growing importance as both market and supplier make it a valuable ally, and it is unsurprising that many states, particularly authoritarian regimes, see a partnership with China as a way of loosening the grip of liberal-democratic powers over the international system. If China wants the United States and its allies to loosen their grip on the international system, so too do many others. By presenting its foreign policy as a quest for sovereignty, non-interference, anti-hegemonism and economic development, whilst at the same time giving legitimacy to corrupt, authoritarian regimes, Beijing has made others realize that they want what Beijing wants.¶ Most analyses of Chinese soft power believe that China’s regime is a liability to its soft power, and insinuate that democracy is a key element of soft power. Similarly, it is often thought that Chinese soft power is undermined by Beijing’s relations with dictators and human rights abusers. This is wrongheaded for a number of reasons. First, China’s soft power is often directed towards undemocratic regimes or states that have greater concerns than Chinese suffrage, and it has successfully attracted them. Second, **China’s government appears to have built legitimacy** perfectly well to international audiences **irrespective of its lack of democracy or** high levels of **corruption**. Which of the following figures was last able to meet President Obama in the Oval Office; the Dalai Lama or the President of the PRC? If that is not extending legitimacy then the concept is too vague to quibble about it further.

### Zero-sum

#### Influence is zero-sum

**Shengjun 12-1**-13 [Zhang, professor at the School of Government, Beijing Normal University, “Zero-sum thinking an inevitable aspect of modern diplomacy,” <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/828984.shtml#.UrUAqtJDuMU>]

China has been reiterating its resolution to adhere to the path of peaceful development and win-win, open diplomacy in recent years, pushing back against groundless claims of a "China threat." However, the framework of peaceful development is not omnipotent and win-win strategies cannot solve all international issues. Refusing to consider zero-sum issues, or dealing with international affairs by using one fixed mindset, cannot lead to balanced diplomacy.¶ In fact, zero-sum thinking is closer to the true nature of modern diplomacy. Modern diplomacy is derived from the political strife between the secular power and the Pope's theocracy in medieval Europe. Without zero-sum conflicts, there wouldn't be progress. ¶ In other words, it is hard to understand the birth and evolution of modern diplomacy without thinking in zero-sum terms, and it is also impossible to grasp the essence of modern diplomacy, such as the policy of "an eye for an eye."¶ Although globalization is a reality of the modern world, **zero-sum games** are not declining; on the contrary, they **are gaining momentum** along with more international exchanges taking place. Zero-sum thinking is becoming even more applicable than before. **China is no exception** from this tendency. Thus, even if a nation is carrying forward a peaceful development philosophy, this does not mean it can ignore or even abandon zero-sum thinking.¶ However, it should be noted that zero-sum thinking is different from the Cold War mentality. That outdated philosophy, bred by the tit-for-tat ideological confrontation between the US and former Soviet Union, goes against the trend of the times and needs to be abandoned. ¶ The Cold War mentality, the "flower of evil," is the extreme result of zero-sum thinking, but rejecting the Cold War mentality does not mean abandoning zero-sum thinking.¶ Putting an emphasis on zero-sum thinking actually complies with the objective law of international affairs, which can be categorized into three aspects. First, there are non-zero-sum games, such as international trade and economic cooperation, on the basis of economic structural complementarities. Second, there are zero-sum games, such as those involving resources and territorial disputes. Third is the combination of non-zero-sum games and zero-sum games, such as international negotiations over climate change. Thus, zero-sum games are showing their regular presence in international affairs. Competition and confrontation are basic forms of international relations, so adopting zero-sum thinking to deal with these issues is a logical step.¶ Zero-sum thinking will be conducive to China projecting a distinctive image on the international community and enhancing its influence and leadership in regional and global affairs. ¶ This philosophy can enable a nation to keep pace as a proactive stakeholder in international issues, and also maintain its decisiveness in making important strategic choices. ¶ If China wants to take more international responsibilities and play a role of leadership, zero-sum thinking will surely make a difference. Although not as typical, going for more soft power and a bigger say is also a kind of zero-sum game.¶ Zero-sum thinking is not an outdated philosophy, but a normal way of thinking which has taken root in international relations. ¶ Chinese diplomacy should be fully aware that only by integrating win-win strategies with zero-sum thinking, can China meet the challenges imposed by the complicated international environment in a calm manner, especially when the relationship between China and the US is inclining toward being more competitive than cooperative. The world cannot be thought of as a utopia, and ignorance of zero-sum games will cost China significantly. Using necessary zero-sum thinking will give China more confidence in dealing with international issues.

#### Official perception is zero-sum- insiders prove

**Perlez ’12** [Jane, Pulitzer-Prize-winning chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times, “Chinese Insider Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S.-China Frictions,” April 2, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html?_r=5&ref=world&>]

The senior leadership of the Chinese government increasingly views the competition between the United States and China as a zero-sum game, with China the likely long-range winner if the American economy and domestic political system continue to stumble, according to an influential Chinese policy analyst. China views the United States as a declining power, but at the same time believes that Washington is trying to fight back to undermine, and even disrupt, the economic and military growth that point to China’s becoming the world’s most powerful country, according to the analyst, Wang Jisi, the co-author of “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” a monograph published this week by the Brookings Institution in Washington and the Institute for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University.¶ Mr. Wang, who has an insider’s view of Chinese foreign policy from his positions on advisory boards of the Chinese Communist Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contributed an assessment of Chinese policy toward the United States. Kenneth Lieberthal, the director of the John L. Thornton Center for China Studies at Brookings, and a former member of the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton, wrote the appraisal of Washington’s attitude toward China.¶ In a joint conclusion, the authors say the level of strategic distrust between the two countries has become so corrosive that if not corrected the countries risk becoming open antagonists.¶ The United States is no longer seen as “that awesome, nor is it trustworthy, and its example to the world and admonitions to China should therefore be much discounted,” Mr. Wang writes of the general view of China’s leadership.¶ In contrast, China has mounting self-confidence in its own economic and military strides, particularly the closing power gap since the start of the Iraq war. In 2003, he argues, America’s gross domestic product was eight times as large as China’s, but today it is less than three times larger.¶ The candid writing by Mr. Wang is striking because of his influence and access, in Washington as well as in Beijing. Mr. Wang, who is dean of Peking University’s School of International Studies and a guest professor at the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army, has wide access to senior American policy makers, making him an unusual repository of information about the thinking in both countries. Mr. Wang said he did not seek approval from the Chinese government to write the study, nor did he consult the government about it.¶ It is fairly rare for a Chinese analyst who is not part of the strident nationalistic drumbeat to strip away the official talk by both the United States and China about mutual cooperation.¶ Both Mr. Wang and Mr. Lieberthal argue that beneath the surface, both countries see deep dangers and threatening motivations in the policies of the other.¶ Mr. Wang writes that the Chinese leadership, backed by the domestic news media and the education system, believes that China’s turn in the world has arrived, and that it is the United States that is “on the wrong side of history.” The period of “keeping a low profile,” a dictum coined by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1989, and continued until now by the departing president, Hu Jintao, is over, Mr. Wang warns.¶ “It is now a question of how many years, rather than how many decades, before China replaces the United States as the largest economy in the world,” he adds.¶ China’s financial successes, starting with weathering the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, the execution of events like the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010, contrast with America’s “alarming” deficit, sluggish economic recovery and polarized domestic politics, Mr. Wang says.¶ He does not address head on the far superior strength of the United States in military weaponry. But he notes that Beijing has developed advanced rocketry and space technology and sophisticated weapons systems without the “United States or the U.S.-led world order.”¶ In the face of China’s strengths, and worries that the United States will be displaced from its premier position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-up spying by American planes and ships along China’s borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wang writes.¶ Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is viewed as an effort to “Westernize” the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will not stand for, he says.¶ That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in the long run against the United States is backed, in part, by Mr. Lieberthal’s appraisal of American policy toward China.¶ Mr. Lieberthal cites findings from American intelligence based on internal discussions among crucial Chinese officials that these officials assume “very much a zero-sum approach” when discussing issues directly and indirectly related to United States-China relations.

### US tradeoff

#### Lack of US influence directly boosts Chinese soft power

**Efthymiou ’12** [Pavlos Efthymiou is reading for a PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge and a BSc in Politics with Economics from the University of Bath, “Chinese Soft Power: Sources And Implications For The US,” December 21, <http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sources-andimplications-for-the-us/>]

Important external factors for the rise of Beijing’s soft power include the failure of the Washington Consensus, the erosion of US soft power and the global economic crisis. In the years following 9/11 America went through its ‘unipolar moment’, which claimed it political capital, weakened alliances and distanced friends. Human rights violations in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib further weakened America’s attractiveness and traumatized its moral example. This paper deems that there was a power vacuum in the realm of ideas that China’s concepts in part came to fill. In parallel, the BJC comes as a bright contrast to the ominously failed Washington Consensus. Even more importantly perhaps,China has managed to maintain robust, double-digit economic growth at the most difficult perhaps time for Western economies since the Great Recession (Halper, 2010:33-37).

### AT: Cred solves the impacts

#### US soft strategies can’t solve- enhances Chinese lash-out

**Cole 11-5**-13 [J. Michael Cole, former intelligence officer at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Taipei-based journalist who focuses on military issues in Northeast Asia and in the Taiwan Strait, “Does China Want a Cold War?” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/does-china-want-a-cold-war/>]

Time and again in recent years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has berated the West — and the U.S. more specifically — for having what it calls a Cold War mentality, a mindset that it said was detrimental to relations with China and undermined security in Asia. Fair enough, but according to a new video co-produced by China’s National Defense University (NDU) that was leaked late last month, a Cold War is exactly what the CCP needs, and contact with the West is a poison pill that must be avoided at all cost.¶ It’s admittedly hard to tell how many members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the CCP adhere to such views, but there is little doubt that 较量无声, or Silent Contest, has some appeal among the more extremist elements within the party, which itself in recent months has warned against the harmful influence of Western values and culture, and passed new regulations to counter their supposedly deleterious effects on Chinese society.¶ Besides NDU, the PLA General Staff Department and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences were involved in producing the documentary, in which a number of senior military officers from various departments are featured. General Liu Yazhou, the political commissar at National Defense University (his father in law was former president Li Xiannian, one of the so-called “eight immortals”), and Wang Xibin, president of NDU, are listed as supervisors for the project.¶ Interestingly, as recently as 2010, Liu was regarded as a potential reformist and voice of moderation within the PLA after he remarked that China must either reform its system U.S.-style or go the way of the Soviet Union. This apparent shift (we should note that Liu was promoted to general in July 2012) raises several questions about the existence, influence, and durability of hoped-for reformers within the PLA.¶ The 100-minute film, which was taken down from popular sites like Weibo soon after it was leaked, but which remains available on YouTube, takes a shot at pretty much everything Western, from U.S. think tanks — the Fulbright Fellowship, the Ford Foundation and the Carter Center are singled out — to electronic music and luxury brands, which are all elements of a plot to “brainwash” Chinese society and destroy China from within.¶ “The American elites … confidently believe that the best way to disorganize China is to work closely with it, allowing it to gradually become part of the U.S.-led international and political system,” Liu is quoted as saying. The conspiracy also extends to Hong Kong, where the U.S. and British consulates are reportedly using their “unusually large” resources in the territory to infiltrate and destabilize China by influencing events such as the annual June 4 and July 1 rallies, the movement against national (“Chinese”) education, as well as Occupy Central.¶ Even military-to-military exchanges, a hallmark of improved ties between Washington and Beijing over the past year, are regarded in the movie not as a means to build confidence between the two competitors, but rather as part of an insidious plot to “disorganize China.” The undercurrent is that the U.S. “soft” strategy of engagement is potentially more dangerous than its military hardware. One of the lessons that the Chinese are ostensibly expected to draw from the documentary, which can be regarded as a critique of China’s “open door policy,” is that contact with the West is nefarious. In fact, the film attributes the collapse of the Soviet Union and other closed societies in large part to a U.S.-led global conspiracy.¶ More tellingly, it claims that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not the precursor to the end the Cold War, as history books have informed us since the watershed event, but rather that the end of the Cold War caused the collapse of the USSR. The Cold War, and the closed, repressive, militarized, and pathologically paranoid system that it had engendered within the Soviet empire was therefore crucial to the survival of the USSR. The foundations of that system were slowly eroded via contact with the West, and once the USSR lost control over the public sphere, the whole building came crashing down.¶ To avoid a similar fate, the CCP must therefore ensure it retains a tight grip on every aspect of Chinese society.¶ If this is indeed the conclusion reached by CCP officials (at this point we must regard the documentary as part of the ongoing dialogue and jockeying for influence that is occurring within the CCP, and not as a policy statement), the ramifications of that shift could be far reaching. Not only could exchanges with the U.S. and other major Western powers suffer, but a country like Taiwan, which is often touted as a model for China and whose growing interactions with the Asian giant it is hoped will spark the flame of democratization, could also suffer the consequences. If Taiwan’s democracy and open society are regarded as a Western import and part of a U.S.-led plot to undermine China, the CCP could conclude that it is in its best interest to pre-empt Taiwan by destroying its liberal way of life, a process that some argue has already begun.¶ Not so long ago, Beijing’s main complaint with the U.S. was that it was stuck in time and unable to think beyond the strategies of the Cold War. Containment was bad. All Washington needed to do was open up to China and the relationship would flourish. For various reasons, the U.S. did just as prescribed. But now Beijing — or at least Silent Contest and its masterminds — warns the viewer that the ensuing exchanges are corrosive and threaten China’s very existence.

## Legit Answers

### 2NC No Impact to Drone Prolif

#### Prolif doesn’t cause wars- restraint wins out

**Goure ’12** [ Daniel Goure, PhD in international relations and Russian studies from the Johns Hopkins University, is a vice president of the Lexington Institute, was a member of the Defense Department’s Transition Team, served as director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of Defense and was a senior analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, Science Applications International Corporation, SRS Technologies, R&D Associates and System Planning Corporation, has been a consultant for the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, has been an adjunct professor in graduate programs at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an adjunct professor at National Defense University, “Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses!” <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses>]

Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence.¶ Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system.¶ Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation.¶ It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya, these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force, then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone.¶ The availability of unmanned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles.

# 1NR

## Europe

#### US cred strategies fail and heg doesn’t solve war anymore- doesn’t solve China war

**Mazarr ’12** [Michael J. Mazarr is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf>]

A third trend is declining U.S. military predominance and a fast-approaching moment when **the U**nited **S**tates **will be unable to project power into key regions** of the world. The reasons are partly technologicalrising actors have burgeoning capabilities in anti-ship missiles, drones, or other ‘‘area denial’’ structures.13 Moreover, actors have also found other ways to counter American power: major states like China or Russia now possess the ability, through financial, space, or energy means, to threaten massive global consequences in response to unwanted U.S. force. This includes cyber mayhem: as one recent survey concluded, cyber weapons ‘‘allow, for the first time in history, small states with minimal¶ defense budgets to inflict serious harm on a vastly stronger foe at extreme ranges,’’¶ a new form of vulnerability that would ‘‘greatly constrain America’s use of force abroad.’’14 An important new RAND report by Paul Davis and Peter Wilson¶ warns of an ‘‘impending crisis in defense planning’’ arising ‘‘from technology¶ diffusion that is leveling aspects of the playing field militarily, geostrategic¶ changes, and the range of potential adversaries.’’15 These challenges are¶ exacerbated by a crisis of defense procurement; **America’s leading**-edge military **systems are becoming less affordable and reliable**. Aircraft carriers, for example, have become prohibitively expensive, with costs set to break through¶ congressionally-imposed limits next year.16 The systems that undergird U.S. military primacy are being whittled down to a small handful that no president will readily risk in anything but the most essential of crises. A fourth threat to U.S. global strategy is that America’s non-military tools of influence have proven incapable of achieving key U.S. goals in the areas nominated as the leading security challenges of the future, transnational, substate threats, and the risks emanating from fragile states. While states have¶ well-established theories for pursuing traditional political-military ends with¶ diplomacy and force, the United States possesses no proven models for achieving progress in the social, psychological, and environmental costs of an integrating globe, areas such as regional instability, terrorism, the complexities of development, radicalism, aggressive nationalism, organized crime, resource shortages, and ecological degradation.17 For half a century, the United States¶ was a dominant global power which identified challenging core goals and tasks, deterring military adventurism, building political-military alliances, erecting¶ mutually-beneficial institutions of tradebut to which Washington could apply¶ established models and techniques. U.S. leadership and power becomes much¶ more problematic in a world of complex problems which generate no broad¶ agreement and which subject themselves to no clear solutions

### Cyber-attacks

#### Question of debate is capabilities we will win that they literally cant attack even if they want to Cyberattacks impossible – no capabilities

Rid ‘12 (Thomas Rid, reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", March/April 2012, “Think Again: Cyberwar”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full)

"Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us." No way. "Cyberwar is coming!" John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since then, it seems to have arrived -- at least by the account of the U.S. military establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the fight. Cyberspace is "a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights," Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is "just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space." In January, the Defense Department vowed to equip the U.S. armed forces for "conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains -- land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace." Meanwhile, growing piles of books and articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and how to survive them. Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. But did it really happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen, but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath. "Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact, potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less.

#### No tech

Rid ‘12 (Thomas, PhD, Reader in War Studies @ King's College London, Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, "Think Again: Cyberwar," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,0, March/April 2012)

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### Bioweapons

#### Dove evidence is fantastic weapnized pathogens have been released before no escalation, the burden is on them to prove extinction, which is functionally impossible

#### Empirics

Easterbrook ‘3 (Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set>=, July 2003)

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### Can’t disperse bioweapons

Smithson ‘5 (Amy E., PhD, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”. http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259, 2005)

Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include the concentration of agent in the delivery system, the ways in which the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent, and the right dosage to incapacitate or kill human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature, and even exposure to oxygen, all of which can kill the microbes. Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. Drying an agent, however, is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry, which is much easier to produce but a great deal harder to disperse effectively. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

### Disease

#### Our Ritger evidence is the most recent cites new policy changes by the CDC which solve sback antibiotic resistance

#### Responses check

Ensom ‘3 (Jim, Crisis Management Trainer at Business Continuity Consultants, Former Editor of Survive Magazine, Former Journalist for the BBC, <http://www.globalcontinuity.com/article/articleview/94/1/30/>, June 20, 2003)

In reaching these landmarks in the containment of SARS, the most severely affected countries and areas have identified and rapidly corrected long-standing weaknesses in their health systems in ways that will mean permanent improvements for the management of all diseases. In addition, systems of data collection and reporting, and new patterns of openly and frankly communicating information to the public will hold the world in good stead when the next new disease emerges and the next influenza pandemic breaks out.

#### Burn out stops disease

Lederberg ‘99 (Joshua, Professor of Genetics – Stanford University School of Medicine, Epidemic The World of Infectious Disease, p. 13, 1999)

The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a dead end when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a wipeout of both host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.

#### Humans will adapt

Gladwell ‘95 (Malcolm, The New Republic, Excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 29, July 17, 1995)

In Plagues and Peoples, which appeared in 1977. William MeNeill pointed out that…while man’s efforts to “remodel” his environment are sometimes a source of new disease. They are seldom a source of serious epidemic disease. Quite the opposite. As humans and new microorganisms interact, they begin to accommodate each other. Human populations slowly build up resistance to circulating infections. What were once virulent infections, such as syphilis become attenuated. Over time, diseases of adults, such as measles and chicken pox, become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve.

## Chechnaya

### Link Debate

#### They don’t read a piece of evidence. Russia probably would not be able to declare Chechnaya a zone of active hostitility because its domestic and the government hides the fact that it’s unstable

#### Framing question- specificity of evidence probability outweighs no specific evidence.

#### Russia models US self-defense precedent

Fisk & Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk --- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm” 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)

Russia

In January 2000, Russia updated its National Security Concept from the previous 1997 version. The Concept detailed the future direction of ensuring Russia's national security, given its perception that international relations were undergoing a period of “transformation” (Russia's National Security Concept 2000). Russia was referring to heightened tensions with the West, exacerbated by the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo (Wallander 2000). One of the most important differences between the previous blueprint for national security under President Yeltsin and the one signed into effect by acting President Vladimir Putin is that the National Security Concept of 2000 allows first use of nuclear weapons—not only against existential threats, but also “in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective” (Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe 2000). This Concept was reaffirmed in a new military doctrine released in April 2000, in which the right to use nuclear weapons against aggression is clearly articulated.41 What is particularly noteworthy is that an earlier draft of the doctrine made an explicit commitment to non-use of preemptive or preventive attacks,42 whereas the final version of the doctrine omits this idea. This suggests that Russian military leaders and political elites were torn about making a definitive statement either way.

In 2003, within the context of the US-led intervention in Iraq, Russia officially called the action an “error.”43 However, Russia never ruled out the use of force in such cases. At one point, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and President Putin both suggested that armed force was an option if the Iraqi government did not comply with UN resolutions, but maintained that any such action must be accompanied by UN Security Council approval (Jasinski 2003). Though Russia joined together with France and Germany against any automatic military action in Iraq, Russia was still considered a swing vote in the UNSC; President Putin “hasn't ruled anything in, and he hasn't ruled anything out.’’44 Russia ultimately condemned the US action in Iraq, yet by mid-May of that same year, Russia and the United States were back on relatively good terms, proclaiming that their “recent differences” had been resolved.45 Our preliminary evidence suggests Russia's agreement with the principle of the intervention—one of preventive self-defense—though not with the Iraq case in particular. Rather, **Russia views such action as appropriate within the context of the war on terrorism. Because of its own strategy in its internal conflict with Chechnya, Russia has been relatively supportive of the use of preventive strikes by the U**nited **S**tates (Westphal 2003). Furthermore, Russian military forces had the authority to strike terrorists preemptively abroad, as the case of Georgia showed (Oldberg 2006:7–8).

In 2010, Russia again updated its military doctrine under President Dmitry Medvedev. Although there had been much discussion about Russia's right to use preventive and preemptive nuclear strikes leading up to the release of the doctrine, there are no explicit references to this in it (Blank 2011). Given the buildup to the release of the new doctrine, this comes as quite a surprise. In 2008, Russian military Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky remarked: “We have no plans to attack anyone, but… to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons.”46 This was the first time nuclear weapons had been referenced publically by Russia as a first-strike option. Russia had previously asserted that it would use preventive strikes as a defense strategy, though such strikes had not been tied to nuclear weapons. **Putin** had **argued that if other countries had the first-strike option, then so did Russia**.46 Among those countries, in Russia's view, is the United States. **Russian perceptions of US actions in this regard support the use of preventive strikes**: “The United States was ready to use nuclear weapons against Iraq in 2003, and then against Iran in 2008. This was clearly demonstrated through statements of high-profile military and political officials. So, saying the U.S. doctrine does not directly include the use of preventive nuclear strikes is not correct.”47

Although the 2010 doctrine does not specify the use of nuclear weapons in first-strike considerations, Russia clearly has supported the idea of preventive attacks. The re-election of Putin has also brought with it a renewed emphasis on military modernization. This can be seen in the country's heavy investment and interest in drones, reflected in deals with Israel and in recent domestic contracts.48 During his recent campaign, Putin advocated modernization as a means to prevent others from seizing Russia's resources. Putin has pledged $770 billion to the modernization effort in the next decade as “ever new regional wars break out in the world.”49 In particular, **Putin points out that “There also are attempts to** provoke such conflicts **even** close to Russia's and its allies’ borders. The basic principles of international law are being degraded and eroded, especially in terms of international security” (Putin 2012). Russia's Chief of General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Makarov has expressed his admiration for US ability to adapt to a new threat environment, saying that the revolution in military affairs achieved “new heights” through US efforts (McDermott 2011). Prominent military theorist Makhmut Gareev emphasizes that Russia must also focus on the changing nature of warfare, and precision weapons aside from nuclear weapons—the type needed for “no contact” network-centric warfare (McDermott 2011, 2012). Finally, Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy on Geopolitical Affairs, recently stated that Russia has learned a lesson from the cases of Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, and warned that the same thing can happen to Russia if it does not have offensive capabilities.50 And just a short time ago, Russia proposed to Israel a joint combat unmanned aerial vehicle program.51 **President Putin declared**, “Experts agree that **drones will play a key role in our future…You know drones are widely used in armed conflict today, and they proved to be quite effective**.”52 Similar to the case of India, **we find evidence that Russia, too, is committed to the norm of preventive self-defense.**

#### Extinction

Stirling 11 - hereditary Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, M.A. in European Studies [The Earl of Stirling 11, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”,http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html]

Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory. The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world's total population. Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon.

#### Russia isn’t chill, they’re wiling out

**Barrett et al. 13** (Anthony M. Barrett- Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Seth D. Baum- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Kelly R. Hostetler- Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia”, http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc\_NuclearWar.pdf)

**War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals**, which are by far the largest of any nations, **could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years**, 1,2,3,4,5,6 potentially **leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity**. 7,8,9,10 **Nuclear war between the US and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch**; deliberate first attack by one nation; **and inadvertent attack**. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs**. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack**. 11,12 (**Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve deliberate manipulation of the risk of otherwise unauthorized or inadvertent attack as part of coercive threats that “leave something to chance,”** i.e., “**taking steps that raise the risk that the crisis will go out of control and end in a general nuclear exchange.”** 13,14 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. 15,16,17 For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 18,19,20 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 21,22 However, it has also been argued that **inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk**.

23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,**33 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack**. 34,35,36,37,38 **False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways**. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 39 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 40,41,42 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 43 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 44 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 45,46,47 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 48,**49 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions**, 50,51,52,53 **with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example of such a crisis**. 54,55,56,57,58 **It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions**. 59 **There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks**. 60,61,62,63

#### Chechen instability spills over --- draws in Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Iran

Garb 98 - Associate Director of International Studies and Professor of Anthropology – University of California, Irvine (Paula, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Ed. Lake and Rothchild, p. 186)

When Russia finally launched a military assault on Chechnya, Fiona Hill (1995, 4) also maintained that the armed conflict had potential to escalate to involve other republics in Russia as well as other countries: “The North Caucasus is a tinderbox where a conflict in one republic has the potential to spark a regional conflagration that will spread beyond its borders into the rest of the Russian Federation, and will invite the involvement of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, and their North Caucasian diasporas. As the war in Chechnya demonstrates, conflict in the region is not easily contained. Chechen fighters cut their teeth in the war between Georgia and Abkhazia,1 the Chechen and North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey is heavily involved in fund-raising and procuring weapons, and the fighting has spilled into republics and territories adjacent to Chechnya.”

#### Emboldens China causes draw-in

#### Conceded Europe Scenario Instability in Europe escalates to global nuclear war

Glaser, Assistant Prof @ Chicago, 1993 (Charles, International Security Summer)

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not unconcerned about Europe’s future.